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Innovation has wreaked creative destruction on traditional
content platforms. During the decade following Napster's rise and
fall, industry organizations launched litigation campaigns to
combat the dramatic downward pricing pressure created by the
advent of zero-price, copyright-infringing content. These campaigns
attracted a torrent of debate among scholars and stakeholders
regarding the proper scope and role of copyright law-but this
ongoing debate has missed the forest for the trees. Industry
organizations have abandoned litigation efforts, and many
copyright owners now compete directly with infringing products by
offering legitimate content at a price of $0.00.
This sea change has ushered in an era of "copyright
freeconomics." Drawing on an emerging body of behavioral-
economics and consumer-psychology literature, this Article
demonstrates that, when faced with the "magic" of zero prices, the
neoclassical economic model underpinning modern U.S. copyright
law collapses. As a result, the shift to a freeconomic model threatens
entrenched tenets that lie at the very heart of copyright law and
theory. This Article argues that the traditional dichotomies
separating use from ownership and utilitarian rights from moral
rights have been seriously eroded, if not outright destroyed. If
copyright law does not evolve to face these changes, it will run the
risk of extinction through irrelevance. Accordingly, this Article both
identifies responsive policy prescriptions and, perhaps more
importantly, establishes a set of structured, coherent, and efficient
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I. INTRODUCTION
Technological and business-model innovations have wreaked
Schumpeterian creative destruction on the traditional avenues of
content' delivery and consumption. During the decade following the
1. As used throughout this Article, the term "content" refers to the types of creative works
affected by the innovations described herein, not to all potentially copyrightable works. Broadly
speaking, the relevant types are audio and audiovisual recordings, text-based works, and (some)
visual works (i.e., the works that are relatively susceptible to reproduction and distribution). As
technology advances, this list may well expand. At some point in the near future, for example,
advances in 3-D printing may cause sculptural works to be added to this list. See generally Lisa
Harouni, A Primer on 3D Printing, TED (Jan. 2012), http://www.ted.com/talks/lisaharouni-a-
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rise and fall of Napster, the content-based business community carried
out a two-pronged deterrence-and-persuasion effort in an attempt to
combat the dramatic downward pricing pressure created by the advent
of zero-price, illegitimate content. This campaign attracted a torrent of
debate among scholars and stakeholders, who variously decried the
end of creativity,2 heralded the end of copyright law,3 worried that
copyright owners would be left at the mercy of infringers, 4 and fretted
that those same owners were acquiring too much control over their
works.5
To a large extent, however, this ongoing debate has missed the
forest for the trees.6 The threats (or boons) posed by online content
distribution, as well as the dangers (or merits) of the industry's
attempt to stifle online copyright infringement, have been at the
center of the legal conversation. Yet, in the meantime, content-
industry trade groups have largely abandoned their deterrence-and-
persuasion campaigns, and entrepreneurs and innovators have been
busy devising and implementing business models aimed at competing
directly with illegitimate offerings. On a wide scale, legitimate-content
firms have incorporated a radical change into their delivery models:
many now offer consumers pseudo-ownership control over legally
licensed content at a price of $0.00.
primer_on_3dprinting.html (overview of recent 3D-printing developments).
2. E.g., Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49
J.L. & ECON. 1 (2006).
3. E.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 269 (2002); see also Paul A. David,
The End of Copyright History?, 1 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 5, 7 (2004) ("[W]e are
approaching the effective demise of. . . copyright .... ).
4. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 538 ("Copyright maximalists . . . argue that the ease of digital
reproduction has enabled piracy on a scale never before witnessed in human history .... .").
5. E.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW To LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 8 (2004) ("For the first time in our
tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share culture fall within the reach
of the regulation of the law, which has expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of
culture and creativity that it never reached before.").
6. A few notable exceptions aside. Professor Lastowka, for example, noted in 2007 that
"the trend in open copyright is toward a price point of zero." Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution:
Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41, 54-55 (2007). Yet his observations were
limited to the field of "open copyright," wherein "amateurs" make content available for "free." Id.
at 47. What Professor Lastowka meant by "free" was, presumably, extremely low-cost content
(i.e., content that required end users to expend only (low) fixed costs, near-zero variable costs,
and opportunity costs in order to consume it). This Article employs a broader focus, including
works that are "free" in the sense that they are offered at a price of zero but may require
consumers to pay, e.g., attention costs due to advertisements. Generally, I will use the term
"zero-price" to denote such content.
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This sea change in favor of zero-price, legitimate content has
ushered in an era of what I refer to as "copyright freeconomics."7 This
Article draws on an emerging body of behavioral economics and
consumer psychology research to demonstrate that the downward
shift from positive prices to zero prices holds extraordinary
consequences for all content-market participants-producers,
distributors, and consumers alike. In the face of the "magic" of zero
prices, the neoclassical economic model that underpins modern U.S.
copyright law8 largely collapses. Consequently, the shift toward a
freeconomic model carries with it sweeping implications for copyright
law and discourse.
Copyright law must rebuild itself to adapt to this new reality.
To effectively and efficiently incentivize the creation and distribution
of original works in the era of "content abundance,"9 U.S. copyright
law will need to account for the new and altered incentives that are
now being faced by content-market participants. This evolution will
not come easily. The changes I advocate threaten two well-entrenched
principles that lie at the very heart of copyright law and scholarship-
the distinction between use and ownership, and the dichotomy that
divides utilitarian rights from moral rights.
This Article is structured as follows. Part II begins with a brief
overview of the standard economic theory currently underlying U.S.
copyright law. I then construct a simple economic model of content-
consumer choice. Drawing on this model as a convenient shorthand
reference point, I outline the changing economic conditions faced by
content-market participants throughout recent history. I next analyze
the development of new business models that rely heavily on zero
prices and pseudo-ownership end user control. Part II concludes by
arguing that these models were made not only possible, but inevitable,
by the historical developments described previously.
7. With apologies to Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, whose FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE
EcONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (2005) is one of the most successful
popular economics books of all time. See Amazon Best Sellers: Best Sellers in Popular Economics,
AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/books/355577011 (last visited July 27, 2013)
(ranking Freakonomics seventh on the Popular Economics Best Sellers list).
8. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 1569, 1580 (2009) (analyzing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. 539 (1985), as an example of a neoclassical application of copyright's fair-use doctrine); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 286 (1996)
(discussing the "neoclassicist" approach to copyright law); Alina Ng, Rights, Privileges, and
Access to Information, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 89, 107 (2010) ("United States copyright
jurisprudence has generally accepted neoclassical economics as the predominant theoretical
approach to allocating entitlements in literary and artistic works . . . .").
9. See Ellen P. Goodman & Anne H. Chen, Modeling Policy for New Public Service Media
Networks, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 153 (2010) (referring to "the world of content abundance').
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Next, Part III surveys the emergent body of literature on the
unique incentives created by zero-price markets. Drawing from the
fields of behavioral economics and consumer psychology, I derive three
observations of particular relevance to copyright law and content
markets. These are the "zero-price effect,"' 0 the shift from "market" to
"social" transactions," and the presence of "irrational"12 consumer
behavior in zero-price markets. 3
Part IV begins by discussing two of the most salient
implications of copyright freeconomics. First, I argue that the old
distinction between content ownership and content use 4 retains little
value today for copyright courts awarding damages for infringement. I
also contend that the presence of the irrational consumer behaviors
discussed in Part III should give rise to a "non-usage" defense under
certain circumstances. On this point, I conclude by setting forth an
efficient analytical framework that incorporates decision-theoretic
burden shifting to guide courts in evaluating such cases.
Second, I maintain that copyright's centuries-old dichotomy
separating utilitarian 5 rights from moral 6 rights is likely no longer
justified. In some instances, copyright's constitutionally mandated
goal of promoting "Progress" 7 may now be served much more
efficiently by moral rights rather than by the bundle of rights
traditionally identified with the utilitarian/incentivizing theory. Thus,
the controversial addition of moral rights to U.S. copyright law 8
10. The zero-price effect refers to consumers' seemingly irrational predilection toward zero-
price options, as indicated by their revealed preferences under both laboratory and real-world
conditions. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS 55-72 (2008).
11. See infra Part III.D.1 & 2.
12. The preferred terminology is "boundedly rational," but the implication is the same. See,
e.g., Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with
Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2224 & n.25 (2012).
13. See infra Part III.D.3.
14. See, e.g., Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Entrepreneurial Copyright Fair Use: Let the
Independent Contractor Stand in the Shoes of the User, 57 ARK. L. REV. 539, 581 (2004) ("[C]ourts
must distinguish between the ownership of a copy, the license to use a copy, and the ownership of
the copyright.").
15. Or "economic." These generally consist of the exclusive rights of reproduction,
distribution, and public display and performance, as well as the right to prepare derivative
works.
16. Or "noneconomic." This group of rights has generally consisted of (at least) the rights of
attribution and integrity.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to
their ... Writings.
18. Compare ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KwALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 1-10 (2009) (arguing that moral rights, including
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may-for the first time-be justified on utilitarian grounds. I propose
evaluating the codification of these rights and suggest an efficient
means of doing so without sacrificing the public interests in content
access and usage.
Part IV closes with a call for further scholarship, highlighting
three broad areas that require additional theoretical and empirical
research. Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, AND MARKET
STRUCTURES OF CONTENT CREATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND
CONSUMPTION
The centuries that have passed since the invention of the
Gutenberg Press in 1450 have witnessed enormous advancements in
the technology used to reproduce, distribute, and consume artistic and
literary content. Increasingly, a pattern of Schumpeterian "creative
destruction" has emerged as the dominant paradigm in content-based
markets.19 Periods of stasis, with costs, prices, and quality holding
relatively steady, have repeatedly been upended by disruptive
innovations. By dramatically decreasing costs (and therefore priceS20),
increasing availability, increasing quality, or some combination of the
three, such innovations have radically changed how society interacts
with creative content. The following discussion traces the recent
history of innovation in content markets and reveals a master
narrative: the past two centuries have witnessed an inexorable march
toward freeconomic models, conditions, and incentives.
Of course, content-industry stakeholders and consumers do not
operate in an entirely free market. Multiple forces-from various
bodies of law, to prevailing social norms, to individual affect-combine
to constrain or influence both creative decisions and revealed
attribution and integrity, ought to play a more prominent role in U.S. copyright law), and Lior
Zemer, Moral Rights: Limited Edition, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1519, 1522 (2011) (arguing for an
expanded version of Kwall's suggested moral-rights regime, while noting that "[a]ny call to
strengthen moral rights in American copyright tradition is an invitation for fierce criticism"),
with Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 301 (2009) (arguing that "we
should consign moral rights law to the dustbin"), and Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights:
Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789, 816 ("Adding a new, generalized attribution right
to American copyright law would be a mistake at this time .... ).
19. The economist Joseph Schumpeter famously coined this term to describe dynamic
competition. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82-86 (1942).
20. Though first-mover advantages and IP protections can temporarily allow an innovative
firm to raise prices above the level that would prevail in a classically competitive market, nearly
all economists would agree that in the long run a decrease in costs will lead to a corresponding
decrease in consumer prices, absent some intervening force or other market failure.
1414 [Vol. 66:5:1409
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preferences with regards to content. Among the relevant bodies of law,
the primary driver is copyright law, the subject of the next Subpart.
A. Overview of the Economic Theory of Copyright Law and Model for
Infringement
Underlying all of U.S. copyright law is the central tenet that if
content were left entirely unregulated, a large-scale market failure
would occur. Broadly speaking, the theory is that society would
systematically underinvest in artistic creation absent copyright
protections. 21 Creating artistic content generally entails sunk costs
that are relatively high in comparison to the low marginal costs of
reproducing the finished work. Were copying to be freely allowed,
copiers could sell their copies at lower prices than creators, given their
lower total costs. In order to allow authors, artists, and (arguably)
intermediate content firms to recoup the sunk costs of initial creation,
copyright law bestows a limited monopoly upon the author of a work.
Law and economics scholars have pointed out that this
monopoly is a "legal monopoly"-a government-granted bundle of
exclusive rights-and not necessarily a monopoly in the sense that
economists typically use the term.22
An economic monopoly exists any time one entity controls a
large share of a market with relatively high barriers to entry, such
that it can charge supracompetitive prices. 23 Neoclassical price theory
tells us that prices in a competitive (i.e., nonmonopolized and
nonoligopolized) market will decline to a firm's marginal costs; thus,
supracompetitive prices are set above the seller's marginal costs. 2 4
Yet, if a copyright does not always grant a monopoly in the
economic sense, the central tenet of copyright law can operate only if
copyrights frequently do in fact grant their owners such a monopoly.
U.S. copyright law operates on the premise that copyright protections
allow their owners to charge above-marginal-cost prices (i.e., it
frequently also grants owners a de facto economic monopoly), although
empirical evidence for this intuition is unfortunately almost
21. See generally Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610-14 (1982) (discussing copyright
markets).
22. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Dorton, Comment, Intellectual Property Tying Arrangements: Has
the Market Power Presumption Reached the End of Its Rope?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 559 &
n.157-60 (2008).
23. See, e.g., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST




nonexistent. 25 By allowing the copyright owner to charge above-
marginal-cost prices, this grant of rights allows recoupment of sunk
costs and capture of enough profits to, ex ante, incentivize creation
and dissemination of the copyrighted work. 26 Without this financial
incentive, authors and artists would produce suboptimal levels of
socially desirable creative output. Thus, copyright law is meant to
solve a market failure and to incentivize artistic creation. 27
The existence of copyright law creates a structural divide
between two content types: legal and illegal. And this divide, in turn,
creates competition between legitimate copyright holders and
illegitimate copyright infringers. Because of the legal differences
between them, these two types of suppliers incur different costs, offer
products that are valued differently by consumers, and charge
different prices for those products. The following subsections recount
the technological advances in content industries, along with the
changing economic structures and incentives that accompanied the
creative destruction wrought by these advances. These subsections
also highlight the differing ways that innovations have impacted the
two types of suppliers (legitimate and infringing) and their potential
and actual customers.
To provide a convenient shorthand method for discussing
changing costs and values of the products offered by legitimate- and
illegitimate-content suppliers, I set forth below a simple model of how
customers evaluate the choice between the two. Here, A represents the
choice of buying the legal (or legitimate) copyrighted product at a cost
to the customer of Ca. The other choice, B, represents buying the
illegal (or illegitimate) product that infringes the copyright at a cost of
Cb. Let V. represent the value to the customer of A, and Vb represent
the value to the customer of B.
Facing the choice between the two, 28 a rational, utility-
maximizing customer will choose A, the legal product, if:
25. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 327-28
(1989); Stan J. Liebowitz, Is Efficient Copyright a Reasonable Goal?, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1692,
1694-95 (2011).
26. Liebowitz, supra note 25, at 1711 ("[]t is far from clear that creators do not need
financial rewards to induct creations, nor is it clear that financial rewards might actually
decrease the value of creative works that are created.").
27. E.g., Li-Jen Shen, A Duration No More Than Necessary: A Proposed Test for the
Duration Requirement of RAM-Copy Fixation, 51 JURIMETRICs J. 217, 241 (2011) ("[T]he purpose
of copyrights is to supply enough of a creation incentive to overcome the market failure that
would result from a complete failure to protect.").
28. Of course, the customer might very well choose neither. Under this formulation, she




Va > Ca and Va - Ca > Vb - Cb
This is so because not only must A yield benefits that are higher than
its costs, it must also offer a greater consumer surplus (V - C over B.
Conversely, the customer will choose B, the infringing product, if:
Vb > Cb and Vb - Cb > V - C.
The legal difference between A and B has implications for Ca
and Cb. Because A will in theory be offered at a price that is above the
seller's marginal costs, Ca will generally be higher than it would be in
a world without copyrights. And because B entails the possibility of
liability for copyright infringement, Cb will likewise be higher than it
would in an environment without copyrights.29 Suppliers and
customers account for this possibility by including it in Cb, such that:
Cb = Z + (Lx P)
Where Z consists of nonliability costs (those allocable to reproduction,
distribution, transaction costs, etc.), L represents the costs of potential
liability should one be found liable for copyright infringement, and P
represents the probability of liability.
This simple model helps conceptualize the effects of various
historical developments on content-market behavior. It does so by
isolating the variables that affect the decision whether to engage in
copyright infringement. The changes discussed below will be related
back to their effects on these variables as well as their effects on
market participants' incentives and behavior.
B. The Analog Era of File Sharing and Content
Consumption: 1801-1982
File sharing30 is generally thought to be the catalyst for the
digital-content revolution at the turn of the millennium. But file
sharing is not a novel development. Indeed, the practice of file sharing
traces its roots at least as far back as the turn of the eighteenth
century. When the Jacquard loom appeared in 1801, it revolutionized
29. To the extent the customer is risk averse, it is also true that Vb will be lower. But for
present purposes, it is safe to assume the customer is perfectly rational.
30. For purposes of this Article, I will roughly define "file sharing" to mean "the distribution
of encoded information among machines."
2013] 1417
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textile production.3' Its use of coded punched cards containing
operating instructions made it vastly more flexible than previous
looms and enabled enormous leaps in production speed.32 And while
these early iterations may be unfamiliar to students of modern
information technology, IBM and others marketed a remarkably
similar punch card technology in connection with the emergence of
electronic computers in the 1940s.33
The quest for better and faster means of transferring files
among computers ultimately led to the replacement of punched cards
with successive generations of floppy disks that both decreased in size
and increased in storage capability. Despite their advantages over
previous iterations of file-sharing technology, however, the physical,
analog nature of these data-storage devices-and their consequent
slow and costly production and distribution-limited their appeal to
average consumers as potential tools for copyright infringement. 34
Furthermore, at least in early formats, operating these technologies
required substantial programming expertise. 35 Finally, their storage
capacity was generally too limited to allow for storage of copyrighted
content like books, 36 audio, and audiovisual works. Thus, their
attractiveness as a platform for copyright infringement was generally
limited to those interested in copying software. And in any event,
early computers were largely incapable of displaying such works; their
size, expense, and required level of operator expertise dictated that
they be designed for more "serious" tasks.37
31. For an in-depth exploration of the history of the Jacquard loom and its impact on
subsequent information technology developments, see JAMES ESSINGER, JACQUARD'S WEB: HOW A
HAND LooM LED TO THE BIRTH OF THE INFORMATION AGE (2004).
32. See id.
33. Not all of these applications were beneficial-IBM infamously "provided the Third Reich
with punch card technology and organizational systems that helped them automate much of
their activities." Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the
Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591, 615.
34. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 7 (2001) (noting the "high costs of production" and "the extraordinarily high
costs of distribution" present in real-space markets); John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product
Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681 (2012).
35. See generally Arthur L. Norberg, High-Technology Calculation in the Early 20th
Century: Punched Card Machinery in Business and Government, 31 TECH. & CULTURE 753, 766-
68 (1990) (discussing punch cards).
36. At least formatted books-unformatted e-books can be quite small. The viewing devices
of the day, however, were limited to desktop computers with relatively low-resolution displays.
37. See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
63, 99 (2003) ("Available microprocessors, the low fidelity of computer peripherals, and
limitations of memory storage capacity prevented music from being stored, perceived, and
reproduced efficiently on computer devices until the mid-1990s.").
1418 [Vol. 66:5:1409
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As a result, consumers of creative content instead remained
faithful to analog technologies. The year 1932 had seen the advent of
recorded audio books, 38 but the vast majority of the market remained
occupied by paper-based products that had not changed substantially
since the invention of the Gutenberg press in 1450.39 From the late
1800s through the 1960s and 1970s, end users of audio works also
generally remained faithful to analog platforms-first vinyl records, 40
then compact audiocassettes. The quality of machines using these
formats advanced rapidly during the mid-twentieth century, while
their costs simultaneously declined.41 Video cassettes appeared in
196942 and followed a similar trajectory of rapid cost and quality
improvements. Although both types of cassette technologies were
initially capable only of playback, by the 1970s, both had also become
capable of duplication. And, as with playback, duplication capabilities
rapidly increased in quality of output and ease of use.
Recognizing the imminent possibility that consumers would
use these new technologies to reproduce copyrighted content,
corporate copyright holders attempted to stifle these innovations,43
perhaps most famously in the Sony litigation involving the Betamax
home videotape recording device. 44 The suit ultimately failed after the
Supreme Court held that "time-shifting" (recording television
programs to allow viewing at consumers' convenience) constituted a
fair use of the copyrighted programs,45 a decision that paved the way
38. See Evolution of Audio Books and Media Players, BOOKSALLEY, http://booksalley.com/
bAMain/bAlleyTO2_Museum.php (last visited July 27, 2013) (discussing the "talking-book
program" established by Congress in 1931).
39. Cf. DAVID A. VISE & MARK MALSEED, THE GOOGLE STORY 1 (2008) ("Not since
Gutenberg invented the modern printing press more than 500 years ago . . . has any new
invention empowered individuals, and transformed access to information, as profoundly as
Google.").
40. Though record players were at first far too expensive for average consumers to afford,
the introduction of the Victrola in 1925 brought high-quality audio playback into the reach of the
middle class. See generally New Music Machine Thrills All Hearers at First Test Here, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1925, at 1.
41. See FRIEDRICH ENGEL & PETER HAMMAR, A SELECTED HISTORY OF MAGNETIC
RECORDING 3 (Richard L. Hess ed., 2006), available at http://www.richardhess.com/tape/
history/EngelHammar--Magnetic TapeHistory.pdf ("[T]he recording technology was beyond
the means of most consumers and was aimed at the professional audio and government
markets.").
42. History of the Video Cassette, SCANDIGITAL (Dec. 22, 2009, 7:00 AM), http:/www.
scandigital.com/blog/video-transfer/history-of-the-video-cassette/.
43. In some ways, this backlash echoed the sheet music publishing industry's reaction to
the advent of disruptive new technologies at the turn of the twentieth century. ADRIAN JOHNS,
PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES 328-33 (2010).
44. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
45. Id. at 456.
2013] 1419
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for further refinements of analog reproduction technology by Sony and
others.4 6 Consequently, large-scale reproduction became a relatively
accessible technology for intermediate firms. These intermediate firms
inevitably used the new technologies to create infringing
reproductions of copyrighted works for sale to the public. And it was
these firms, rather than individual end users, that were generally the
targets of industry lawsuits.47
On the whole, however, analog home recording was still beset
by the distribution problems that inhere in tangible products. 48
Additionally, making copies using analog formats inevitably degraded
data quality, reducing the utility of the copies produced (Vb). And,
importantly, even if individual users could create relatively high-
quality copies from home or engage the services of a professional
infringer, it was still difficult for the average individual to exploit
demand for infringing copies outside her own circle of acquaintances.
The nature of the market was, by definition, underground, and the
need for secrecy made it difficult or impossible to capture a broader
consumer base through advertising. Furthermore, transaction costs in
an underground market for real-space goods are generally higher than
those incurred in legitimate markets-avoiding detection by private
investigators or law-enforcement officials necessitates using relatively
inefficient transaction methods.49 Because infringing suppliers were
unable to spread the fixed costs of specialized, high-end equipment
over as many customers as were legitimate suppliers, legitimate
suppliers enjoyed either a quality advantage (such that V, > Vb) if
infringing suppliers used low-end equipment, or a price advantage due
to economies of scale (such that C. < Cb) if infringing suppliers used
high-end equipment. And, of course, after both suppliers and (by
extension) buyers accounted for the potential liability for copyright
infringement (L x P), any relative price advantage enjoyed by
infringing content providers was reduced accordingly.
46. VHS ultimately succeeded in destroying Betamax where Universal and others failed-
after losing a bitter format war in the 1980s, Betamax was relegated to little more than a
historical curiosity.
47. See, e.g., RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(involving a retailer that owned an audiocassette copying machine that it used to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted sound recordings); Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib.,
Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (involving a record store that offered an on-site tape
recorder, sold blank tapes, and rented audio recordings to customers). Even Sony involved the
manufacturer of a technology, rather than its users. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 419.
48. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
49. Cf. Philip J. Cook et al., Underground Gun Markets, 117 ECON. J. 558, 589 (2007)
(finding that transaction costs are high in underground gun markets).
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Assuming copyright law's grant of a legal monopoly was
functioning as intended, then the prices of A during this period were
above marginal costs-thus, it would seem that illegitimate providers
(who do not need to recover sunk creation costs) should have enjoyed
at least some price advantage (such that Cb < Ca). 50 But as long as
content existed in real space, the quality disadvantage, lack of
economies of scale, higher transaction costs, and litigation risk
uniquely entailed by infringement meant that even if copyright
holders were exacting above-cost prices from consumers, infringement
was not a particularly attractive alternative for either suppliers or
consumers during the analog era.
All of the foregoing fits well within the standard economic
theories and assumptions underlying copyright law. Yet, as
demonstrated infra, the standard account fails to capture a great deal
of real-world incentives and behaviors in modern content markets. For
now, it should be noted that supplying infringing content during the
analog era still entailed monetary costs. To the extent analog-era
individuals wanted to supply infringing content at a price of $0.00 for
nonfinancial (or indirectly financial) reasons, or as part of a barter
system,5 1 they would have incurred more than just litigation-risk
costs; they would also necessarily forfeit reproduction and distribution
costs. Thus, potential zero-price suppliers remained relatively
unwilling to commit copyright infringement and were therefore unable
to put much downward pressure on retail prices of legal content.
C. PCs and Digital Media Increase Demand for All Content and
Supply-Side Capacity for Infringement
The confluence of several factors in the 1980s and 1990s laid
the groundwork for a radical shift in how individuals consume-and
infringe-copyrighted materials. Primary among these was the largely
exogenous introduction and widespread acceptance of the personal
digital computer, which allowed consumers to harness previously
unheard-of processing and storage capability in the privacy of their
50. The general intuition regarding monopoly rents (often associated with the Chicago
School) is that they will attract both price and nonprice competition. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke,
Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. IIL. L. REV. 497, 497-98.
51. As it turned out, once given the opportunity, quite a few individuals began to do just
that. See Tushar K. Nandi & Fabrice Rochelandet, The Incentives for Contributing Digital
Contents over P2P Networks: An Empirical Investigation, 5 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT
ISSUES 19, 31 (2008) (finding that "contribution behavior" can be "motivated by social influence").
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own homes.52 At the same time, several important endogenous
developments appeared in rapid succession.
The first was the development of compact discs ("CDs") in 1982,
which broadly readied the public for digitized content files. 53 Relative
to previous formats, CDs allowed for near-perfect reproduction and
substantially increased storage capacity. CDs were also less
specialized-they could contain an array of content or data. Soon
thereafter, CDs became readable by computers. And beyond mere
playback, end users could also copy files from CDs onto their hard
drives with no data-quality degradation. 54 Computers, unlike previous
content devices, access data stored intangibly in strings of object
code.55 The intangibility of code, coupled with years of exponential
growth in processing speeds5 6 and hard drive capacity, allowed for
nearly instantaneous, high-quality copying that entailed marginal
costs approaching zero.
As personal computers came into broad use, individual end
users found that they could suddenly make thousands, even millions,
of copies of digital files from their own homes. And they could do so at
virtually no cost.5 7 Of course, an individual end user would have no
use for or incentive to create digital copies of files she already
possessed. Without some way to distribute copies to others, the rapidly
increasing ability of end users to create high-quality reproductions of
media files was largely irrelevant.
By 1988, consumers could acquire computer hardware and
accompanying software programs (together, "CD burners") that
offered the ability to reproduce files from a hard drive onto an empty
52. See generally Menell, supra note 37, at 69-73 (discussing the advent of the digital
computer).
53. CDs also became the dominant distribution platform for software programs, although
that function is increasingly being served by online delivery paths. And beyond the advantages of
online software distribution lie those offered by cloud computing-"Software as a Service"
("SaaS") models are fast becoming the predominant method of software provision and
consumption. See Zvi Grauer, SaaS Coming of Age, SERVERBEACH, http://www.serverbeach.com/
resources/SaaS%20Coming%2of/o2OAge (last visited July 27, 2013).
54. See Mohsen Manesh, The Immorality of Theft, the Amorality of Infringement, 2006
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 1 5, available at http://stlr.stanford.edulpdflManesh-immorality.pdf.
55. See generally Heidi S. Bond, Many-to-Many Contracts, 86 TUL. L. REV. 519, 533 (2012)
(briefly discussing the differences between object code and source code).
56. "Moore's Law" was coined to describe the rapid pace of growth in processing capability
over the previous two decades. Moore's Law and Intel Innovation, INTEL, http://www.intel.com/
contentlwww/us/en/history/museum-gordon-moore-law.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
57. Without an Internet Protocol ("IP') address discoverable through a subpoena of an
Internet Service Provider ("ISP"), such end user copying was virtually undetectable by copyright
owners-thus, both Z and (L, x Pt) were almost nonexistent.
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CD.58 This functionality allowed individual consumers to cheaply and
quickly reproduce digital media files onto a transferable-albeit still
physical-medium with no data-quality degradation. And again, video
followed a similar (though delayed) trajectory. 59
Thus, during this time period, production costs-and also Cr-
continued to decrease. And, for the first time, Vb began to rival V. But
while the variable costs allocable to reproduction had fallen to
essentially zero for an isolated end user creating infringing copies on
her own computer's hard drive, real-space reproduction and
distribution still entailed costs for both infringers and legitimate
firms. The difficulties of transacting in a real-space, underground
market and the liability risk accompanying illegitimate content,
however, still uniquely disfavored infringing-content providers and
consumers. And because reproduction aimed at distribution, as well as
distribution itself, still entailed monetary costs, those who wanted to
supply content at zero price were still generally unwilling or unable to
do so.
D. The Infringement Explosion: A Network of Networks, Data
Compression Technology, and Nonliability and Liability Costs
No single innovation has changed content reproduction,
distribution, and consumption more than readily available, low-cost,
high-speed Internet access.60 The speed with which the U.S.
population has adopted usage of the Internet has been truly
remarkable-from 1995 through 2013, usage rates among American
adults more than sextupled from 14% to 85%.61 This phenomenon was
partly exogenous and partly endogenous to copyrighted-works
markets. While the Internet's myriad uses all combined to spur its
rapid adoption, a large part of its adoption was due to consumers'
rabid appetite for online distribution of media.62
58. History of Taiyo Yuden CD-R, EDOCPUBLISH.COM, http://www.edocpublish.com/
resources-2/history-of-taiyo-yuden-cd-r/ (last visited July 27, 2013).
59. See HUGH BENNETT, UNDERSTANDING RECORDABLE & REWRITABLE DVD 21 (2004) ("By
far the quickest and least expensive way to duplicate a disc is to copy it using a computer
outfitted with a DVD recorder combined with off the shelf writing software.").
60. Cf. David, supra note 3, at 7.
61. Internet Adoption, 1995-2013, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, http://www.
pewinternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Internet-Adoption.aspx
(last visited July 27, 2013). And rates are even higher among certain demographics: 98% among
those aged 18-29, for example. Id.
62. See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 296 ("The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack
cocaine of the Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more powerfully than
any other single application.").
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As long as personal computers remained largely unconnected to
each other, content reproduction and distribution remained dependent
on real-space technologies. But the advent of widespread Internet
access changed all of that. Suddenly, digitized content files had the
potential to be distributed intangibly over large geographic distances
via the Internet, avoiding real-space distribution costs.63 The advent of
widespread Internet access did to the role of content distributor what
the development of digital computers did to the role of content
reproducer.64 Distribution could now be done by almost anyone with
access to a personal computer and the Internet-which increasingly
meant that it could be done by almost anyone, period.65
Just as importantly, the rise of the Internet meant that users
no longer needed to physically leave the privacy of their own homes in
order to procure or supply infringing materials. 66 And the anonymous
FTP,67 which was standardized in the 1980s, meant that individuals
were able to maintain a relatively high level of anonymity when
accessing materials virtually.68 Thus, the structural features of the
Internet dramatically increased both supply- and demand-side
anonymity (or at least the perception thereof) and concurrently
reduced the previously high transaction costs of doing business in
infringement markets.69 Given the proper software platform, the
potential now existed for eliminating the "underground advertising"
problem. Finally, perceived anonymity-coupled with some
uncertainty as to whether transferring copyrighted digital files via the
Internet was a violation of U.S. copyright law 70-reduced liability
63. Mary Madden, The State of Music Online: Ten Years After Napster, PEW INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT (June 15, 2009), http://pewinternet.orgfReports/2009/9-The-State-of-Music-
Online-Ten-Years-After-Napster/The-State-of-Music-Online-Ten-Years-After-Napster/3-
Partying-like-its-1999until-the-subpoenas-come-in.aspx.
64. See Manesh, supra note 54, 5 ("Mhe Internet has dramatically reduced the costs
associated with distributing these 'ripped' copies of copyrighted works.").
65. See Internet Adoption, 1995-2013, supra note 61.
66. Manesh, supra note 54, 5 ("[U] sers can now transfer 'ripped' files from home without
ever leaving their computer.").
67. FTP is an acronym for "File Transfer Protocol," which-due in no small part to the
anonymity (and resulting security) it allowed-quickly became the predominant method of online
file transfer. See Anonymous FTP, ZEN & ART INTERNET, http://www.cs.indiana.edul
docproject/zen/zen-1.0_5.html (last visited July 27, 2013).
68. Subsequent legal developments reduced somewhat the level of actual anonymity that
users enjoyed.
69. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
70. See Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1860 (2009) ("[L]egal uncertainty may create the tipping point towards
noncompliance in environments where there is a low probability of enforcement, as in the case of
file sharing on peer-to-peer networks.").
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costs, uniquely reducing the inherent disadvantage of infringing
content.
Lossy data compression formats71 were developed and
standardized in the early 1990s. The smaller file sizes greatly reduced
the demands that distributing and storing digital-media files placed
on hard drive and transmission assets.72 And although these
compression formats dramatically reduce the size of the resulting file,
they do so without hindering the perceived quality of the final
product.73
All of this created a massive and ever-increasing number of
individuals with access to substantial digital storage capacity; a ready
supply of copyrighted materials copied from physical formats; the
ability to compress digitized content to facilitate online transmission;
and the infrastructure necessary for relatively anonymous, rapid, and
essentially costless distribution of high-quality infringing content.
With supply-side noncreation costs (Z) nearing zero, the door was
opened for end users interested in supplying content for noneconomic
reasons or as part of a barter system to offer illegitimate content at a
price of zero. Although top-down, for-profit file-hosting serviceS74 were
launched with some commercial success, end users were clearly
prepared to become both online consumers and suppliers of media files
on a massive scale. All that was needed was a platform for them to
connect with each other.
E. End-to-End File Sharing and the Content Industry's Failed
Litigation-Deterrence Campaigns
In 1999, Shawn Fanning and Sean Parker developed Napster,
a freely downloadable software program that allowed individual end
users with an Internet connection to discover digital-content files
stored on any other user's hard drive via a central indexing server and
71. "Lossy," as opposed to 'lossless," compression algorithms do degrade file quality, but
modern formats generally do so using techniques that render the final product indistinguishable
from the original to most humans. But see Oleksandr Pastukhov, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J.
10, 12 (2010) (claiming that music files that have been compressed "are not as appealing as CDs
to trained ears").
72. Eric S. Boorstin, Music Sales in the Age of File Sharing (Apr. 3, 2004) (unpublished A.B.
dissertation, Princeton University), available at http://pdf.aminer.org/000/299/018/the-powerof
p_p.beyond.filesharing.pdf ("It takes two to three hours to download a CD audio song from a
56k modem operating a[t] peak capacity. The MP3 format cuts this time to 12 to 18 minutes."
(citation omitted)).
73. Id. ("A three-minute song in CD audio format is 32 megabytes. The same song in MP3
format compresses to about 3 megabytes with little loss in quality.").
74. The file-hosting model involves uploading a file to a server maintained by the host,
which then provides Internet links that allow end users to directly download the file.
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to reproduce those files onto their own hard drive. At the same time,
Napster made users' own digital libraries accessible to other users,
effectively turning end users into both consumers and suppliers of
content, the substantial majority of which was copyrighted. 75 And
while Napster was not the first end-to-end file-sharing network,76 it
enjoyed the greatest success among first-generation offerings.77
End-to-end file-sharing platforms paved the way for what
would arguably prove to be the most radical change in the economics
of content markets-and the incentives and behavior of market
participants-in all of history. Marginal costs approaching zero and
supply that grew ever closer to infinite, existing within an end-to-end
network of millions of connected individuals, ushered in the "age of
content abundance."76 Inclined individuals could suddenly provide
infringing materials to millions of recipients at a price of zero-a price
that triggers unique behavior on the part of consumers and
suppliers.79 As a result, consumers faced a decision between paying a
zero price for B80 and paying a positive price for A.
Ever-litigious corporate copyright holders reacted swiftly. A
group of content firms successfully obtained an injunction against
Napster in 200081 (affirmed by the Second Circuit in early 2001)82 that
effectively crippled the service just two years after its inception.
Ultimately, Napster's centralized structure proved to be its downfall:
it required the significant capital expenditure necessary to acquire
and operate a proprietary, centralized server;83 allowed Napster to
gain knowledge and control of users' activities that weighed heavily in
75. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (finding that 87% of the files available for download on Napster were copyrighted), aff'd in
part & rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
76. The now-defunct Audiogalaxy could likely lay claim to that honor. Codrut Nistor, File
Sharing-History, PCTIPS3000 (June 24, 2009), http:www.petips3000.com/file-sharing-history/.
77. Usage peaked at about 25 million individuals sharing 80 million digital files. Joseph D.
Lienjdlien, A Guide to Peer-to-Peer Filesharing (Part 2): The Beginnings of P2P, MY OPERA (Sept.
11, 2010), http://my.opera.com/portalnews/blog/2010/09/11/a-guide-to-peer-to-peer-filesharing-
part-2-the-beginnings-of-p2p.
78. See Ellen P. Goodman & Anne H. Chen, Modeling Policy for New Public Service Media
Networks, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 153 (2010).
79. See infra Part III.
80. Setting aside for the moment the question of infringement-liability costs (P x L), a topic
that is explored in Part III.A, infra.
81. Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
82. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 11), 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001)
('The district court correctly recognized that a preliminary injunction against Napster's
participation in copyright infringement is not only warranted but required.").
83. Cf. Alexander Peukert, A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network
Environment, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 4 (2005).
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favor of the plaintiffs' contributory- and vicarious-infringement
liability theories; 84 and rendered the entire service vulnerable to a
single injunction.85
Even before Napster's eventual demise, however, multiple
second-generation peer-to-peer ("P2P") services had risen up in its
stead.86 The newer offerings were truly decentralized, as individual
users' computers (instead of a proprietary server) were now used for
indexing. This decentralization had the intended and actual effect of
discouraging copyright-infringement lawsuits. Many were also
"located"87 overseas, further complicating enforcement efforts.88 And
while Napster had allowed users to download a single file from only
one other user (necessarily fixing latency at the slower of the two
Internet connection speeds), the development of "bittorrent"
technology allowed users, for the first time, to concurrently download
small portions of files from multiple sources, further decreasing Cb.89
The success of these second-generation offerings has overshadowed
that of Napster by several orders of magnitude.90
Amidst this upheaval, legitimate-content firms were 'left
unsure how to proceed in order to prevent further consumer
substitution away from their product and toward infringing content.
There were two copyright-based litigation options: sue facilitators (the
second-generation P2P services) or sue end users. The content firms
chose both.
84. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021-24.
85. Napster itself declared bankruptcy the following year and sold its assets to Roxio, Inc., a
more conventional pay-service provider. See Roxio Buys Napster Assets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28,
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/28/business/roxio-buys-napster-assets.html. As of this
writing, the Napster brand was still being used to promote a paid-subscription music service.
86. See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (2011)
("When, however, the final verdict in Napster arrived, a new generation of file-sharing
applications was already in use.").
87. At least to the extent that term can be applied to a decentralized, online file-sharing
service.
88. Richard Menta, Napster Clones, MP3NEWSWIRE.NET (Aug. 20, 2001), http://www.
mp3newswire.net/stories/2001/topclones.html (noting that multiple contemporary file-sharing
programs were based outside the United States). For a discussion of legal developments
surrounding multinational, "cloud-based" disputes, see generally Damon C. Andrews & John M.
Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id =2227671.
89. For an explanation of "bittorrent" technology, see Paul Gil, Torrents 101: How Torrent
Downloading Works, ABOUT.CoM (July 2013), http://netforbeginners.about.com/od/peersharing
/a/torrenthandbook.htm.
90. One study found that BitTorrent, a popular bittorrent protocol, accounted for over half
of all Internet traffic in South America and Europe in 2008 and 2009. HENDRIK SCHULz & KLAUS




On the facilitator front, the decade following Napster's
bankruptcy devolved into a protracted series of legal battles between
powerful corporate copyright stakeholders and a ragtag band of
programmers, "free culture"91 advocates, hackers, and the relatively
small firms responsible for developing and introducing the second
generation of massively popular P2P software platforms. 92 This
copyright war spanned the globe and, in MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., reached the U.S. Supreme Court.93
Yet, despite their financial and political clout, entertainment
and media companies have largely found themselves playing a high-
stakes "game of Whac-a-Mole." 94 Consider, for example, one of the
more recent high-profile takedowns of a file-sharing service. In August
2006, a group of major record companies filed suit against LimeWire,
a P2P file-sharing client that used the popular Gnutella network
protocol.95 Following more than four years of litigation, the district
court issued an injunction ordering the program to be shut down.96
But LimeWire, a second-generation file-sharing program, would prove
to be much harder to disable than its predecessors. Since it was
merely a Gnutella client, shutting down LimeWire had no effect on the
underlying network-users could still access Gnutella through a
multitude of similar client software. Additionally, because the
LimeWire source code had already been distributed freely, "anybody
c[ould] modify it and distribute it themselves. And, in fact, this ha[d]
91. A term used somewhat loosely to describe those who argue for radical overhaul of
modern copyright regimes that they perceive as overly restrictive; it traces its roots to Lawrence
Lessig's book of the same name. See LESSIG, supra note 5; see also, e.g., QuestionCopyright,
Copying Is Not Theft-Official Version, YouTUBE (Apr. 1, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-IeTybKLlpM4 ("free culture anthem").
92. Geoffrey Neri, Note, Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms? Unauthorized Music Downloading
and Unsettled Social Norms, 93 GEO. L.J. 733, 750-51 (2005) ("Scores of second-generation file-
sharing programs appearing in the wake of Napster's demise have proven more popular than
Napster as well as more resistant to legal challenge.").
93. 545 U.S. 913, 936-41 (2005) (holding that Grokster and Streamcast (d/bla/ Morpheus)
could be liable to plaintiffs-twenty-eight media conglomerates-on an "inducement liability"
theory of copyright infringement).
94. E.g., Todd R. Weiss, Google Search Algorithm Update Means Better Copyright
Protection, EWEEK (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Search-Engines/Google-Search-
Algorithm-Update-Means-Better-Copyright-Protection-184969/ ("It's a giant game of Whac-a-
Mole.").
95. See Complaint for Federal Copyright Infringement, Common Law Copyright
Infringement, and Unfair Competition, Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4,
2006) (No. 06 CV 5936), 2006 WL 2582075.
96. (Proposed) Consent Injunction, Arista Records, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26,
2010) (No. 06 Civ. 05936 (KMW)), 2010 WL 4256219; LimeWire File Sharing Halted by




been happening for years."97 Thus, even before the court order went
into effect, clone programs like FrostWire-which essentially
duplicated LimeWire's functionality-were already being distributed
and used.98
The LimeWire example illustrates just how unsuccessful
attempts to eradicate file-sharing facilitators have been. 99 As
Lawrence Lessig put it, "[W]e've been waging a war against [file
sharers] for 10 years, and it has failed."100 The technologies used by
file-sharing programs, clients, and networks have become significantly
less susceptible to legal remedies while retaining end user popularity
in the face of large-scale, sustained media campaigns funded by
corporate copyright owners. Even in the days of Napster, upwards of
ten thousand copyrighted files were being reproduced every second.101
And digital-content-file reproduction and distribution may now
account for over half of all Internet traffic in some parts of the
world.102
Finally, although predicting the future is generally a fool's
game, especially in the world of information technology, new
technologies have recently emerged that may prove to be even more
difficult for corporate content firms to counter. Take the "cloud-
computing" 103 service Dropbox, for example. 104 Dropbox, one of the
first cloud-storage offerings to gain widespread usage, can be and is
used for a multitude of purposes (likely satisfying the Sony standard
97. Andrew, Court Injunction Against LimeWire Won't Kill Forks of LimeWire . . . or
Gnutella, Nw. PROGRESSIVE INST. ADvOc. (Oct. 26, 2010, 9:56 PM), http://www.nwprogressive.
org/weblog/2010/10/court-injunction-against-limewire-wont.html.
98. Ernesto, FrostWire 'Kills' Gnutella to Go All BitTorrent, TORRENTFREAK (June 27,
2011), http://torrentfreak.com/frostwire-kills-gnutella-to-go-all-bittorrent-110627/.
99. See generally Depoorter et al., supra note 86 (positing that enforcement efforts against
the file-sharing community have been "so ineffective" in part due to a backlash against
overzealous copyright enforcement).
100. Posting by efcarrasco, remixin, Lawrence Lessig: War Against File Sharers "Has Failed"
(Feb. 6, 2009), http://www.remixin.comlefcarrasco/blog/lawrence-lessig-war-against-file-sharers-
has-faile.html.
101. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
102. See SCHULZ & MOCHALSKI, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
103. What is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG. (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
0,2817,2372163,00.asp:
In the simplest terms, cloud computing means storing and accessing data and
programs over the Internet instead of your computer's hard drive. . . . For it to be
considered "cloud computing," you need to access your data or your programs over the





for legality105), and Dropbox, Inc. does not appear to have distributed
the program "with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright"106 (likely satisfying the Grokster standard). But Dropbox is
also capable of, and will likely be used for, substantial amounts of
illegitimate file sharing.107
If their campaign against file-sharing facilitators has gone
poorly, content firms' attack on consumers has gone even worse. Early
on, some scholars predicted that copyright holders would limit their
litigation efforts to targeting intermediate facilitators due to the high
costs of bringing copyright lawsuits.108 Admittedly, the typically not-
for-profit nature of end users' alleged infringements rendered
unattractive the "actual damages plus defendant's profits" remedy
allowed under U.S. copyright law 09 But statutory damages were a
different story-even at the bare minimum of $750 for "normal"
infringement per work infringed, an individual found to have
infringed the copyrights in 1000 works could be held liable for
$750,000, more than enough to offset litigation costs. 110 Thus,
realizing the difficulty of successfully containing second-generation
file-sharing networks-and no doubt calculating that statutory
damages awards against individuals who were copying hundreds or
thousands of seemingly "free" copyrighted works could be highly
lucrative-content firms quickly turned their attention toward
individual file sharers.
In June 2003, the Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") launched a controversial litigation campaign targeting
individual file sharers."1 The Motion Picture Association of America
("MPAA"), the RIAA's counterpart in the film industry, joined the
campaign in 2004.112 Professors Lemley and Reese, writing in 2004,
105. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (holding that
distributing a device "capable of substantial noninfringing uses" does not violate U.S. copyright
law).
106. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
107. See Christina Warren, What Megaupload Teaches Us About the Cloud, SOPA, and
Backups, MASHABLE (Jan. 20, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/01/20/megaupload-sopa-dropbox/.
108. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1376-77 (2004) (noting that it "is not cost effective to sue each end user for
copyright infringement" and that it is "generally considered bad for public relations to sue your
customers").
109. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2012).
110. Even excluding the possibility that, as allowed by the Copyright Act, the court granted
attorney's fees and costs to the successful plaintiff.
111. John Borland, RIAA Lawsuits Yield Mixed Results, CNET NEWS (Dec. 4, 2003, 4:00
AM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1027-5113188.html.
112. Grant Gross, MPAA to Sue Movie File Swappers, PCWORLD (Nov. 4, 2004, 3:00 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/118485/mpaa.to-sue-movie_file-swappers.html; MPAA v. The
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stated that "[s]uing actual infringers is becoming passe in digital
copyright law" and dismissed the first wave of suits as anomalous.113
With the benefit of hindsight, the opposite seems to have been true. In
fact, such litigation efforts increasingly became the primary tool used
by content providers to combat infringement. As of 2006, the RIAA
stopped reporting how many lawsuits it had filed against individuals;
by that time, it had already sued 17,587 people. 114 One estimate puts
the final total at 35,000 lawsuits.116
These campaigns were roundly criticized. Much of the public
ire was drawn by litigation outcomes that one court called "simply
shocking"" 6 and "monstrous."117 Another judge, addressing content
firms' counsel, admonished that "the formalities of this are basically
bankrupting people and it's terribly critical that you stop it."118 Only
two file-sharing defendants actually proceeded to trial; each was found
liable for copyright infringement after protracted litigation that
yielded six- and seven-figure damages awards in favor of content-
industry groups. 119
The specter of drawn-out litigation and massive damages
awards induced the overwhelming majority of targeted individuals to
settle out of court. A pattern quickly emerged: after obtaining the
name and address of an individual behind an IP address, industry
People, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/MPAA-vThePeople/ (last visited July
27, 2013).
113. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 108.
114. RIAA vs. College Students: File Sharing Lawsuit Statistics (Infographic),
COLLEGESTATS.ORG, http://collegestats.org/articles/2010/02/the-riaa-vs-college-students/ (last
visited Aug. 7, 2013) (displaying data collected from Associated Press, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, and others).
115. Will Moseley, Note, A New (Old) Solution for Online Copyright Enforcement After
Thomas and Tenenbaum, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311, 331-32 (2010).
116. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1054 (D. Minn. 2010).
117. Id. at 1055.
118. Heather Neaveill, The RIAA Versus the People: A File-Sharing Witch Hunt, 21 DCBA
BRIEF 24 (2009) (quoting Transcript of Motion Hearing at 11:1-7, Capitol Records v. Alaujan, 593
F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Mass. June 17, 2008) (No. 03-11661-NG)), available at http://www.dcbabrief.
org/vol2lO2O9art3.html.
119. The first was Joel Tenenbaum, who faced a $675,000 verdict that was eventually
reduced-as being unconstitutionally excessive-to $67,600. Sony BMG Music Entm't v.
Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 117 (D. Mass. 2010). On appeal, however, the First Circuit
declared that the district court had violated the principle of constitutional avoidance by ruling on
substantive due process grounds where a similar result could have been reached using the
common-law remittitur doctrine. See Sony BMG Music Ent. v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 508-15
(1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012). The second was Jamie Thomas-Rasset, a
single mother of four who, following her second trial, was found liable for $1,920,000. Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1002 (D. Minn. 2011), rev'd, 692 F.3d 899
(8th Cir. 2012). A third trial yielded an award of $1,500,000, which the district court reduced on
constitutional grounds to $2,250 per song. Id. at 1001-03.
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associations would send a "settlement" letter (essentially, a demand
letter) to the individual. 120 Targeted individuals were forced to decide
between paying the amount demanded and arguing their case in
court-a process that, as seen above, may extend over half a decade
and yield an adverse judgment in the millions of dollars. 121
Unsurprisingly, most chose to settle.122
In late 2008, the RIAA announced that it was planning to drop
its end user lawsuit strategy.123 General industry perception was that
the campaign had been a "public-relations disaster for the
industry." 24 Critics denounced it as a "file-sharing witch hunt"125 and
"legal blackmail."126 Additionally, a growing body of empirical evidence
suggested that the lawsuits yielded relatively minimal reductions in
file sharing.127 One recent study suggests that in some circumstances,
ramping up copyright enforcement efforts may actually cause a
"backlash" of increased copyright infringement.128 Whatever the
causes, the content industry's end user campaign has been widely
acknowledged as a failure.
What some have dubbed the "Copyright Wars"129 is certainly
not over. Recent headlines have underscored the increasingly
120. Ray Beckerman, How the RIAA Litigation Process Works (Apr. 9, 2008),
http:/fbeckermanlegal.com/pdf/?file=/howriaa.htm ("Their settlement [offer was] usually for
$3750, non-negotiable, and contain[ed] numerous one-sided and unusual provisions.")
121. As one scholar points out in an analogous context, the goal of many litigants is not to
proceed to trial, but to induce lucrative settlements. See Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees
Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCl. & TECH. L. REV. 219, 223 (2011).
122. From those who settled, somewhat lesser-known-but no less controversial-stories
emerged. See generally Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve Year-Olds, Grandmothers, and Other Good
Targets for the Recording Industry's File Sharing Litigation, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 133,
146 (2006).
123. David Kravets, Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign, WIRED
(May 18, 2010, 1:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/05/riaa-bump/.
124. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 19, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html.
125. See, e.g., Neaveill, supra note 118 (calling the litigation campaign against end users a
"Witch Hunt").
126. Nate Anderson, The "Legal Blackmail" Business: Inside a P2P Settlement Factory, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 29, 2010, 2:40 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/09/amounts-
to-blackmail-inside-a-p2p-settlement-letter-factory.ars.
127. Sudip Bhattacharjee et al., Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activity:
An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions, 49 J.L. & ECON. 91, 111 (2006) (finding evidence
that litigation efforts marginally deterred large-volume file sharers but concluding that
"downloading options still abound for those seeking to download").
128. See Depoorter et al., supra note 86.
129. See, e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009); Lia Timson,





prominent role that copyright occupies in not only the content
marketplace, but also the everyday lives of U.S. residents. Some
skirmishes have resembled the battles against file-sharing programs:
the popular torrent-hosting site Pirate Bay, for example, was targeted
by various copyright holders and blocked entirely by several national
governments.130 Other conflicts have involved large, established firms
that, though they do not hold large numbers of copyrights, nonetheless
deal in content delivery. Here, the first major clash occurred in early
2012, when well-known (and well-funded) corporations like Google,
eBay, and Yahoo temporarily "blacked out" their homepages to protest
the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act ("SOPA"). 131 The bill was
subsequently abandoned. 132
Infringement platforms have proved to be resilient, if not
impossible, to eradicate. And consumers have not been deterred much
(if at all) from using them. As one commentator stated bluntly, "If
after ten years and millions of dollars in legal fees [copyright holders]
finally manage to kill the Pirate Bay, there are hundreds of other
torrent sites that exist, and more will spring up. If they ban torrents
altogether, the internet will invent something new." 133 For present
purposes, the salient fact is this: Average end users remain readily
able, willing, and eager to choose option B.
Since Napster, infringing content has represented-for the first
time-a zero-price alternative to legitimate content. As the foregoing
historical account illustrates, the trends that led to this development
are long-term and structural. The master narrative that has emerged
is one of ever-decreasing costs, increasing quality, and the presence of
infringing content as a true competitive threat to legitimate markets.
In short, the changes brought about by these trends are here to stay.
And in the face of the failure of the for-profit content industry's
litigation campaigns, option B began to (and continues to) exert
massive downward pricing pressure on option A. As a result,
legitimate competitors have been forced to change tactics.
130. Don Reisinger, Indian Court Overturns Vimeo, Pirate Bay Blockade, CNET (June 20,
2012, 8:28 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57456945-93/indian-court-overturns-vimeo-
pirate-bay-blockade/.
131. Ned Potter, SOPA Blackout: Wikipedia, Google, Wired Protest 'Internet Censorship',
ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/technology/2012/01/sopa-
blackout-wikipedia-google-wired-join-protest-against-internet-censorship/.
132. Erick Schonfeld, In Face of Protests, Congressmen Begin to Abandon SOPA Ship,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 18, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/18/congressmen-abandon-sopal.
133. Paul Tassi, You Will Never Kill Piracy, and Piracy Will Never Kill You, FORBES (Feb. 3,




III. THE RISE OF CONTENT FREECONOMICS
The creative destruction wreaked by technological innovation
and the accordant shifts in content-market economics have combined
to create readily available zero-price, infringing content that offers
value equivalent to that offered by legitimate content. Faced with such
competition and forced to confront the failure of legal enforcement
mechanisms to eradicate digital infringement, legitimate-content
firms have responded with innovations of their own. This Part
describes the structural shift toward zero-price, legitimate-content
delivery-the rise of "content freeconomics."
A. Introduction: Zero Prices, Nonzero Costs
As shown above, the costs of content creation, reproduction,
and distribution have declined to the point that the only significant
cost left to be borne by suppliers and consumers of infringing content
is litigation risk, (L x P). Even at the height of the litigation campaign
against facilitators and end users, however, that risk was not
particularly great. The following discussion illustrates just how
minimal the cost of litigation risk was.
Consumers rarely, if ever, actually solve for (L x P). And in any
event, the sort of data required for such a calculation is never
available ex ante. Yet, as a means of illustrating with at least some
measure of preciseness what consumers routinely do using rough
estimates, consider the following. In 2006, Internet penetration in the
United States had reached 73%, which, given the size of the U.S.
population at the time, meant that about 147 million adults were
Internet users. 134 RIAA statistics indicate that in 2006, 19% of U.S.
Internet users had downloaded music illegally.135 We can thus
estimate the number of U.S. Internet users who had downloaded
music illegally to be 27.93 million.136 Though the RIAA was not the
only possible source of an infringement lawsuit, RIAA members
appear to have overwhelmingly dominated the field;137 thus, RIAA
statistics can serve as a useful proxy for the total number of copyright-
134. Madden, supra note 63.
135. For Students Doing Reports, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last visited Aug. 7,
2013) (collecting statistics).
136. Note that this number is likely lower than the total number of Internet users who had
downloaded infringing materials, as it does not include any users who had downloaded infringing
software programs, films, photographs, etc., but had not downloaded illegitimate music files.
137. A Westlaw search for "music & download! /p copyright /s infring! & da(aft 1/1/2006 & bef
12/31/2006)" yields 43 hits, none of which involved "independent" copyright holders (i.e.,
copyright plaintiffs who were neither members nor subsidiaries of members of the RIAA).
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infringement lawsuits. Because the RIAA stopped reporting lawsuit
volume in February 2006, the data from 2005 will have to suffice.
Thus, assume that roughly 8200 individuals were sued in 2006.138
Using these figures, an infringing music downloader faced a 0.0294%
chance of litigation (P = .000294). If the downloader chose the majority
route and settled for $3000 (the average settlement amount during
that time period)139 instead of proceeding to trial, 140 L would be $3000,
and the expected cost of litigation risk (L x P) would be only $0.88.141
At an expected cost of $0.88, it would take only one zero-price music
album download before Vb - Cb > V. - Ca, given that legitimate prices
ranged from around $10 for digital albums 42 to roughly $16 for
physical albums at that time.143
For illustrative purposes, assume that a purely hypothetical
2006 consumer wanted to acquire just one album, which she valued at
$18, and that she was indifferent as to the value of legitimate versus
illegitimate content-thus, Vb and V equal $18. Using the above
values, we can see that
Vb> Cb and Vb - Cb > V - Ca
for either a digital or physical comparison. For the digital A-versus-B
comparison, the actual figures are
$18 > $0.88 and $18 - $0.88 > $18 - $10
Thus, the infringing option would create greater consumer surplus
than the legitimate option, even after discounting for liability risk.
And as a result, the purely rational and perfectly informed (and also
138. RIAA vs. College Students, supra note 114.
139. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., RIAA VS. THE PEOPLE: FOUR YEARS LATER 4 (2007),
available at http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa at four.pdf.
140. Recall that only two individuals sued by RIAA members actually proceeded to trial,
making this a fairly safe assumption.
141. This would hold true only if all infringers faced an equal risk of litigation; as discussed
further infra, because the RIAA generally targeted only larger-volume infringers, a smaller-
volume infringer would properly determine the cost to be even lower. This figure also excludes
attorneys' fees, given that such fees are minimal or nonexistent where targeted individuals
simply settle out of court.
142. E.g., Legal Music Downloading Programs, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/list 7231419
legal-music-downloading-programs.html (last visited July 28, 2010) ("[Digital] albums cost an
average of $10.").





therefore necessarily hypothetical)14 4 digital-album consumer would
choose to infringe. For the real-space A-versus-B comparison, the
actual figures are
$18 > 0.88 and $18 - $0.88 > $18 - $16
Again, the consumer would choose to infringe. Using these
figures, if our hypothetical consumer wanted to acquire just one album
(either digital or physical), then it made rational economic sense for
her to choose B, the zero-price, infringing alternative.
The settlement amounts requested by industry trade groups
did not vary greatly with the quantity of infringed content; rather, the
amounts were kept low enough to discourage targeted end users from
retaining defense counsel. Given a fixed litigation-risk cost (L x P), it
would seem that some smaller-volume consumers might be
incentivized to choose A and avoid infringement. Because the RIAA
generally targeted only larger-volume infringers, however,145 a
smaller-volume infringer would properly determine the expected cost
of litigation risk to be even lower than $0.88. In fact, because smaller
download volume reduced P so greatly-consequently lowering Cb to a
level approaching zero-smaller-volume consumers would have
rationally chosen B over A. And some larger-volume consumers were
also incentivized to choose B even despite the relatively higher (Lx P)
associated with high-volume infringement because high volume
caused Vb to outweigh Cb and caused Cb to be less than Co (as in the
example above).
Of course, as the foregoing implies, option B was not clearly a
better option in all circumstances. Depending on the desired quantity
of content, and given the uncertainties faced by end users at the time,
it is likely that some rational consumers (especially those who desired
very little content) still chose A. Furthermore, to the extent that
consumers facing this choice tended to be risk averse, the threat of
litigation would have caused them to perceive relatively higher Cb and
militated toward choosing A.14 6 Finally, path dependency and
switching costs meant that some consumers remained locked into
physical albums.147 And indeed, reality reflected these conditions-
144. See infra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of homo economicus).
145. See Depoorter et al., supra note 86.
146. For a broad econometric analysis of risk aversion, see John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in
the Small and in the Large, 32 ECONOMETRICA 122 (1964).
147. See generally Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in, and




legitimate sales of content did not immediately plummet to zero,
despite much content-industry hand wringing regarding that
possibility. 148
Yet, the crucial difference between the infringing content that
these new technologies offered and legitimate content was the
infringing content's price: $0.00. This price had, and continues to
have, profound market implications. As discussed in Parts III.C-D,
the "zero-price effect" drastically increased the attractiveness of
substituting away from A toward B.149 That, in turn, meant that
option B put immense downward pressure on the price of A. The
question facing copyright owners who had profited under the old
regime became "how do you compete with free?"150 Increasingly, the
answer has been to offer competing zero-price options.151
B. The Explosion of Zero-Price, Legitimate Content
Today, the array of legitimate, "professional"152 content that is
accessible at zero or negligible prices is truly incredible. Spotify, a
music-streaming service launched in 2011, provides a good illustration
of this shift. One of Spotify's cofounders specifically identified the
rationale for the company's business model as creating an option A
that could compete on the merits with B: "[W]e started thinking about
how we could create a product that was better than piracy." 53 At the
time of its launch, Spotify offered consumers on-demand access to a
searchable library of 15 million songs for $0.00.154 By 2012, its library
148. E.g., RIAA, 2011 YEAR-END SHIPMENT STATISTIcS 2 (2012) (noting that legitimate music
sales comprised almost $7 billion during 2011, a year-over-year increase compared to 2010
figures).
149. See infra Parts III.C-D.
150. See Madden, supra note 63 (describing the consumer demand for free music).
151. Some early scholars predicted this development. See, e.g., Eric Schlachter, The
Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on
the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 23 (1997) ("[T]he profit-maximizing price on the
Internet may be where marginal revenue equals marginal cost [i.e., zero cost and price] because
intellectual property will be cross-subsidized by other products in a manner sufficient to cover
the fixed costs associated with intellectual property creation and distribution.").
152. As Professor Lastowka pointed out in 2007, "open copyright 'amateurs' " were even
earlier adopters of zero-price models. Lastowka, supra note 6, at 55.
153. Adrian Covert, Why Did It Take So Long for Spotify to Come to the US?, GIZMODO (July
13, 2011, 10:02 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5821056/why-did-it-take-so-long-for-spotify-to-come-to-
the-us?tag--spotify.
154. Doug Gross, Myspace Gains 1 Million Users, Touts More Music than Spotify, CNN (Feb.




comprised over 17 million songs 55 and was growing at a rate of over
20,000 songs per day. 56 Consider the reality confronting a consumer
just ten years before: in 2002, the price of a music "single" hovered
around $6.157 Even taking into account the fact that real-space singles
generally included two or three tracks each, the 2002 consumer would
have needed to pay roughly $36 million to access an equivalent to
Spotify's $0.00 library. And in 2012, Spotify was not even the largest
repository of accessible zero-price music-the social network Myspace
offered a player that could access over 42 million songs. To match that
number in real-space CD-format singles, the 2002 consumer would
have paid about $100.8 million.
Similar offerings have become available in other content
markets. Online video service Hulu, for example, offered zero-price
streaming of just over 1800 copyrighted television series (with roughly
one season per series) in 2012.158 Just ten years earlier, the retail
price for real-space copies of a single season of a television show
ranged from around $30 to $70 (or more).159 Using those figures, a
consumer in 2002 would have paid anywhere from $54,000 to
$126,000 to gain equivalent access to the same amount of television
content that Hulu-just one of many zero-price streaming-video
providers-started offering for a price of $0.00. And, as of 2012, Hulu
offered more than zero-price television; its library also included over
550 zero-price, feature-length films. Using an estimate of $20 per film,
the 2002 consumer would have needed to pay another $11,000 to
access the Hulu-equivalent amount of film content.
And the examples go on-with books, for instance, the
nonprofit Open Library offers over 2.8 million works. 60 Even using a
conservative estimate of $15 per book,161 amassing an equivalent real-
space library in 2002 would have cost $18 million. As for scholarly
155. Rip Empson, 18+ Million Users and 17+ Million Tracks Later, Leaked Spotify
Recruitment Deck Offers Peek at First Sketch of UI, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/25/17-million-users-and-tracks-later-leaked-spotify-recruitment-
deck-offers-peek-at-first-sketch-of-uil.
156. Information, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about/music-catalogue-info/ (last
visited July 14, 2013).
157. Michael DeGusta, Album Prices, THEUNDERSTATEMENT (Feb. 18, 2011), http://
theunderstatement.com/post/3377858909/album-prices.
158. HULU, http://www.hulu.com (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
159. Feanor727 & Zugzwangl52, Comments to TV Shows on DVD Cost Too Much,
ANANDTECH Fs. (Dec. 10, 2002), http://forums.anandtech.com/archive/index.php/t-942038.html.
160. Accessible Book, OPEN LIBRARY, http://openlibrary.org/subjects/accessible-book (last
visited July 14, 2013).
161. See, e.g., Average Book Prices 2012, LAKELAND LIBRARY, http://tln.lib.mi.us/dept/
technical-services/acq/files/AverageBookPrices20l2.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
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articles, the Social Science Research Network ("SSRN") offers
hundreds of thousands of full-text, zero-price papers.162 Per-article
prices in the past (depending on the journal) generally ranged from
$10 to $40; using that estimate, amassing the equivalent to the
SSRN's library would previously have cost anywhere from $3.5 to $14
million. 163 Zero-price software options have multiplied as well, from
Google's SaaS products to Sun Microsystems' MySQL database
management system. 164
1. The New Models: Multisided Markets and Freemium Access
Following the explosion of zero-price, legitimate content, two
for-profit business models have gained prominence. The first,
frequently referred to as "ad-supported," relies on a two-sided market
structure. 165 On one side of the market are consumers, who are able to
access zero-price content that is accompanied by advertisements. 166 On
the other side are firms that pay the content provider for
advertisement space.167
The second model, generally known as "freemium" allows
content providers to price discriminate by offering one version of their
platform (typically with fewer products, more advertisements,
bandwidth limitations, or some combination of the three) for $0.00,
while offering a premium version of the platform at a positive price.168
For example, Hulu adopted a hybrid freemium model consisting of a
stripped-down, ad-supported, zero-price version and a paid-
subscription (albeit also ad-supported)169 service dubbed "Hulu Plus."
162. Search eLibrary, SSRN, http://papers.ssrn.com/ (last visited July 14, 2013).
163. Of course, a portion of the articles available on SSRN are works in progress, arguably
lowering their value.
164. See Benjamin Edelman, Priced and Unpriced Online Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 21,
26 (2009) (providing examples of various online services that are funded by bundled offerings).
165. MICHAEL VOGELSANG, DIGITALIZATION IN OPEN ECONOMIES: THEORY AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 64-77 (2010) (describing the general dynamics of, summarizing the literature on,
and modeling the development of a business strategy for two-sided markets).
166. See United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 69-70
(2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that online content firms generate revenue primarily via
advertisements).
167. For a discussion of ad-supported services, see Edelman, supra note 164, at 25-26.
168. See Koen Pauwels & Allen Weiss, Moving from Free to Fee: How Online Firms Market to
Change Their Business Model Successfully, 72 J. MARKETING 14 (2008) (providing a general
overview of pricing options faced by digital content providers who wish to charge positive prices).




In software markets, Google's SaaS email service Gmail 70 and Sun's
MySQL171 provide somewhat similar examples.
These new business models exhibit two unique, interrelated
aspects that have gone largely unexplored by copyright scholars thus
far. First, the zero-price content now being offered, while nominally
not "owned" by end users, is converging on outright ownership in
terms of the control and rights it allows end users. Second, the
primary source of copyright-based revenues under these models has
become usage, rather than a one-time wealth transfer in exchange for
outright ownership.
a. Pseudo-ownership Control
The basic two-sided, ad-supported business model itself is not
particularly new, having appeared historically in various iterations,
including newspapers, radio, and television. And at least some of those
(e.g., radio and broadcast television) offered content at a price of $0.00.
One novel aspect of the newest wave of Internet-based, zero-price
services, however, is the degree of control over consumption they grant
to end users. The old-model ad-supported content offerings that did
grant ownership-type control did not do so at zero prices-almost all
real-space newspapers, for example, still charged (and continue to
charge) subscription fees. The zero-price, real-space models, on the
other hand, relegated end users to a relatively passive role. This helps
to explain why the introduction of home recorders like the Betamax
was so hotly contested by copyright holders:172 even relatively small
incremental increases in end user control (i.e., the ability to time and
space shift) represented a threat to the prevailing business model.
The new zero-price models, however, grant users control rights
that begin to converge on ownership. Whereas even Betamax users
remained dependent on content providers to preselect and deliver
programs during the time and through the television channels
available to the end user, the new model allows end users to instantly
access programs originally delivered at any time1 73 and via a
170. The Gmail freemium model consists of an ad-supported, zero-price service and an ad-
free pay service designed for businesses. Pricing-Google Apps for Business, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.comlenterprise/apps/business/pricing.html (last visited July 14, 2013).
171. See Edelman, supra note 164, at 26 ("Sun Microsystems offers the widely used MySQL
database at no charge-but consulting, training, and technical support all have fees.").
172. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (describing the history of Betamax and
its relevance to copyright law).
173. Hulu, for example, has offered multiple zero-price programs that originally aired as
early as the 1920s-well before most of its users were born. Browse TV Shows, HULU,
http://www.hulu.com/browse/tv?src=topnav (last visited July 14, 2013) (filter by decade).
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multitude of channels174 that end users may or may not have
originally been able to access. Furthermore, whereas the old-style
model in the era of analog home recording still required end users to
essentially transfer content from one medium (broadcast) to another
(magnetic-tape storage) to allow time and space shifting, the new
model does not. Instead, it allows for on-demand time shifting, space
shifting, pausing, resetting, and a host of other features in the original
content format itself. To take one specific example, there is little
practical difference from the end-user point of view between
constructing a customized playlist of songs to stream on Spotify175 and
that same end user purchasing those songs and constructing a
customized playlist of songs on her own hard drive. Spotify even
allows importing owned files from an end user's hard drive directly
into the Spotify platform, further blurring the old ownership-access
dichotomy.
Some would argue that comparing the services identified as
examples above (Spotify, Hulu, Google's SaaS offerings, and the like)
to traditional ownership-based transactions is an "apples to oranges"
comparison. Admittedly, access is not precisely the same as
ownership. But the new zero-price model of A-adopted in response to
the constant downward pricing pressure created by a zero-price option
B-has blurred such distinctions nearly to the point of rendering them
obsolete. In their place is a form of "pseudo-ownership" with
substantial implications for the practice and study of copyright law.
b. Usage-Based Licensing Revenues
The second unique aspect relevant here is that copyright-
related revenues are generated quite differently in intangible models
than in real-space models. Under the prevailing real-space model of
ownership, the content provider generates income by collecting a one-
time, upfront payment. Under the pseudo-ownership, ad-supported
model, however, revenues are based on usage. 176 And to the extent
some freemium models contain an ad-supported, zero-price element,
that element similarly generates revenues based on usage.
Furthermore, even the freemium aspect depends to some degree
(albeit indirectly) on usage rates; it operates on the assumption that
174. The same service has offered programs that initially aired on networks in Australia,
Britain, Japan, and a multitude of other countries. Id. (filter by network).
175. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text (describing the Spotify model).
176. "Usage" can be measured by a variety of metrics, from bandwidth consumption, to




some customers lured into using a zero-price version may eventually
trade up to a paid version.
To illustrate the difference, consider the following example.
Columbia Records collected roughly $6 for each single of Nickelback's
"How You Remind Me" it sold in 2002.177 Regardless of a consumer's
usage-whether she listened to the song one time or one hundred
times-Columbia's revenue was $6. Under the new model, however,
Columbia could collect anywhere from a few cents (in the case of a
listener who accesses the song once) to hundreds of dollars (in the
extreme case of a listener who accesses the song thousands of times).
The key point is that in zero-price legitimate-content markets, usage,
not a single sale, has become the touchstone of copyright revenues.
2. Zero-Price Creative Labor Markets
While usage has become the touchstone of copyright revenues,
many content providers-for-profit and nonprofit alike-now offer
content creators a means of distribution yet provide them with little or
no financial remuneration. Nonprofit entities, perhaps unsurprisingly,
have begun frequently to attract and use this source of low-cost labor
en route to offering substantial amounts of zero-price content.
Funding here is generated by a variety of sources. Some, like for-profit
firms, adopt multisided or freemium models. Others look elsewhere.
The Khan Academy, for example, which offered over 4000 video
lectures viewed over 175 million times as of 2012, received donations
and grants from individuals, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,
Google, and others. 17s Online encyclopedia Wikipedia similarly
functions on donations, maintaining an advertisement-free
environment. 179 And it is not only nonprofit firms that have adopted
this model-the Berkeley Electronic Press, SSRN, hosts of
nonmonetized blogs, and a multitude of others are among for-profit
providers that leverage zero-price creative labor. Finally, and more
controversially, hackers and programmers have taken up the mantle
of "free culture" activism by creating platforms for online file sharing
that, unlike Napster, are not driven by profit seeking.
The upshot of these developments is that, for the first time in
history, those who wish to supply content at a price of zero for
177. See DeGusta, supra note 157 (displaying price data for albums and singles since the
1970s). The example was chosen due to its status as the top-selling single of 2002, rather than
any personal affinity for it on the part of this author.
178. KHAN ACAD., http://www.khanacademy.org/ (last visited July 14, 2013).
179. WIKIPEDIA, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (last visited July 14, 2013).
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noneconomic reasons or as part of a barter system 80 (i.e., without
receiving direct pecuniary compensation for their labor) can
realistically do so in a scalable manner.181 This holds true as to both
legitimate and infringing content. But for present purposes, most
salient is the fact that individuals have responded to these
opportunities by engaging in widespread creative production and
distribution. Thus, these platforms hold important implications for
copyright's constitutionally mandated goal of incentivizing
creativity.182
C. Behavioral Economics and Consumer Psychology Research on Zero
Prices: Overview and the "Zero-Price Effect"
Neoclassical economics, with its assumption of a "perfectly
rational, utility maximizing, narrowly self-interested" individual,83
employs standard models that assume linear utility. 8 4 Under this
view, utility, or how much value a consumer derives from a good or
service, does not vary with price. A consumer values a widget at, for
example, $10 whether its price is $5 or $15. So long as prices move
downward in tandem along demand curves with equal slopes, a
change in the price of one competing product to zero should have no
substitutive effect on choices between the two products. 85
The standard account and model, however, leave out one very
important factor: the "magic" of zero prices. Recent research in
180. For a zero-price P2P file-sharing network to function, it requires at least some users to
make files available for others to download free of charge-if all end users were pure consumers,
the network would fail for lack of supply. Some have theorized that this sharing can be explained
as an informal quid pro quo, or barter, exchange ("I'll make my files available for you to
download if you do the same for me."). See, e.g., Ryan Porter & Yoav Shoham, Addressing the
Free-Rider Problem in File-Sharing Systems: A Mechanism-Design Approach, STAN. U.
COMPUTER Sci. DEP'T, http://ai.stanford.edul-shoham/www%20papers/p2p-ECO4.pdf (last visited
Aug. 8, 2013) (identifying more efficient file-sharing mechanisms that can counteract the free-
riding problem).
181. See Nandi & Rochelandet, supra note 51, at 21 (noting the success and prevalence of
P2P networks despite free riding).
182. See infra Part IV.B (examining the supply side of the music industry).
183. Some have dubbed this curious creature "homo economicus," wryly inferring that she
does not exist outside the abstract world of neoclassical economics. See, e.g., Max Huffman,
Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 115 (2012) (describing
the inception of the behavioral economics movement).
184. See, e.g., Michble Sennhauser, Why the Linear Utility Function Is a Risky Choice in
Discrete-Choice Experiments 1 (Univ. of Zurich Socioeconomic Inst., Working Paper No. 1014,
2010) ('The utility function is usually assumed to be linear in its attributes.").
185. Of course, the net downward move in prices could induce additional customers to move
from purchasing nothing to purchasing something, but-using the standard model-there should
be no relative change in demand as between the two positive choices.
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behavioral economics has demonstrated that when faced with a
comparison between a zero-priced option and a positively priced
option, "dramatically more participants choose the cheaper option,
whereas dramatically fewer participants choose the more expensive
option. Thus, people appear to act as if zero pricing of a good not only
decreases its cost but also adds to its benefits."186 This effect exists
even where the standard cost-benefit analysis, or an alternative "ratio-
based" cost-benefit analysis, would seem to favor the positively priced
product.187 Furthermore, the effect cannot be explained away by an
absence of transaction costs (i.e., the objection that consumers might
lopsidedly favor zero-priced goods because nonprice transactions do
not entail many, if any, costs of transacting); mapping difficulty (i.e.,
the potential explanation that consumers prefer zero-price options due
to an inability to evaluate the utility of hedonic goods); or (at least
under some conditions) social norms. 88 In sum, under at least some
circumstances, utility does not map linearly onto prices; rather, the
positive affect associated with zero prices causes an outsized increase
in valuation as indicated by consumers' revealed preferences.189
Researchers have dubbed this the "zero-price effect." 90
D. Further Behavioral Sciences Research on Zero Prices
Beyond the zero-price effect, behavioral economists and
consumer psychologists have begun to identify other unique attributes
186. Kristina Shampan'er et al., Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free Products, 26
MARKETING SCI. 742, 742 (2007). The basic structure of the experiments that first confirmed the
zero-price effect involved two different sets of prices for the same two products. The first set of
prices generally consisted of two positive prices (e.g., $0.01 and $0.15); the second set consisted of
one positive and one zero price, with both prices having been reduced as compared to the first set
(e.g., $0.00 and $0.14).
187. Id. at 747 ("Mhe results of Experiment 2 demonstrate that valuations of free goods
increase beyond their cost-benefit differences. . .
188. Id. at 749-50.
189. Interestingly, this positive affect does not necessarily occur in consumers faced with
zero-value, nonprice attributes. In fact, at least where consumers are faced with at least two
options, the shift from a positive value to a zero value can actually cause consumers to prefer the
option with the positive-value nonprice attribute-even where that value is objectively
undesirable. See Mauricio M. Palmeira, The Zero-Comparison Effect, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 16,
16 (2011) (arguing that the removal of a positive value can eliminate a useful reference point for
consumers, thereby causing what Professor Palmeira calls the "zero-comparison" effect).
190. See ARIELY, supra note 10, at 55-72. The overwhelming attractiveness to consumers of
zero prices can also be witnessed in myriad business settings. For just one example, consider
AT&T's entry into the issuing side of the credit-card market in 1990. Its "Universal Card" was
the first large-scale card to offer a $0.00 annual fee. This feature proved popular enough that, in
the wake of AT&Ts entry, "over 400 other issuers began selectively waiving their own annual
fees to keep customers from defecting to AT&T." Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The
Antitrust Economics of Credit Card Networks, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 653 (1995).
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of and reactions to zero prices. Unfortunately, the field of intangible
intellectual property-based goods remains largely underexplored in
this regard.191 And the broader field of zero-price research, nascent as
it is, is still evolving.192 This growing body of research does, however,
hold important ramifications for future copyright law and scholarship.
1. Social Norms, Market Norms, and Labor Allocation
Where wages are zero in dollar terms, people generally apply
social-rather than market-norms in making decisions about
whether to engage in labor or how much effort to put forth. Drawing
on Alan P. Fiske's "Relational Models Theory" of social interactions,193
Professors Heyman and Ariely have demonstrated that potential
market participants' incentives to engage in effort depend in part on
which of two types of markets is at play-monetary markets or "social
markets."194 Contrary to what the neoclassical model would predict,
Heyman and Ariely found that increasing payments from zero to a
positive (but low) amount in a monetary market may actually decrease
the amount of effort participants were willing to exert.195 This effect
was not present, however, in a social contract that involved no
monetary amounts (or mention thereof). 96 It should be noted that
their empirical analysis did not explicitly address content markets;
instead, it utilized three experiments involving loading a sofa into a
van,197 repeatedly dragging a digital ball across a computer screen,198
and attempting to solve puzzles in a laboratory setting.199 Their study
191. See infra Part I.C.
192. See, e.g., Ahmed Driouchi, Youssef Chetioui & Meryem Baddou, How Zero Price Affects
Demand?: Experimental Evidence from the Moroccan Telecommunication Market 20 (Munich
Pers. RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 32352, 2011), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/32352/lMPRA-paper_32352.pdf (finding that affect does not completely explain
the zero-price effect and arguing that "the zero-price model remains a complex model, and much
additional work is needed to understand the complexities of this model in the marketplace").
193. Fiske's theory divided human interactions into four types: communal sharing, authority
ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. See generally ALAN P. FISKE, STRUCTURES OF
SOCIAL LIFE: THE FOUR ELEMENTARY FORMS OF HUMAN RELATIONS 3-12 (1991). Subsequent
empirical research has generally reinforced the theory. See Nick Haslam, Research on the
Relational Models: An Overview, in RELATIONAL MODELS THEORY: A CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEW
27, 52 (Nick Haslam ed., 2004) ("[T]he theory has stood up quite well to comparisons with other
theories.").
194. James Heyman & Dan Ariely, Effort for Payment: A Tale of Two Markets, 15 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 787, 787 (2004).
195. See id. at 791.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 788.
198. Id. at 790.
199. Id. at 791.
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did, however, focus on situations in which "payment is independent of
effort," a trait that also characterizes the creation level of content
markets.2 00
2. Consumption Choices in Social Markets
Somewhat similarly, where prices are zero (e.g., in a social
market), consumers appear to apply social norms instead of market
norms in deciding whether to acquire a product. One study, for
example, showed that when students were offered a piece of candy at a
price of $0.01, each student took an average of about four pieces.
When offered the same candy at a price of $0.00, however, almost none
of the students took more than a single piece. 201 The standard
economic account holds that, as price increases, output demanded
decreases, yet these revealed preferences demonstrate the remarkable
phenomenon of increasing output at increasing prices-a demand
curve shaped something like a capital "D," instead of the typical
downward-sloping line. The behavior was explained by the take-only-
one-piece social norm brought into play by lowering the price of the
candy to zero and thereby creating a social market. More intuitively,
at the group level, the study also showed that a greater percentage of
consumers opted to acquire the candy when it was offered at a zero
price.202
3. Overconsumption and Hoarding
Finally, consumers reacting to zero prices sometimes engage in
behavior that appears to be wasteful or inefficient. More specifically,
research suggests that people often engage in overconsumption and
hoarding when products or resources are available to them at a price
of zero. Such behavior is particularly likely to occur where individuals
are able to externalize some or all of the costs of their behavior.
For example, economists studying the use of public roads have
long recognized that absent any sort of "road pricing," drivers will tend
to overuse roads, causing congestion to rise above efficient levels.203
200. See supra Part II.A.
201. Shampan'er et al., supra note 186, at 743-50 (discussing the findings contained in Dan
Ariely, Uri Gneezy & Ernan Haruvy, Social Norms and the Price of Zero (2006) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with MIT)).
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., ALFRED C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 186 (1921) (arguing that roads
are overused because drivers are able to externalize the congestion costs they create); Robin
Lindsey, Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Road Pricing? The Intellectual History of an Idea,
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Also within the field of transportation studies, some scholars studying
the usage of airport slotS20 4 contend that "serious economic
inefficiencies," including congestion, appear where prices are not set at
cost by market forces. 205 Similarly, in the case of environmental
pollution, individuals tend to treat the environment as a "free" and
limitless good, thus leading to inefficient levels of "consumption" of
that good.206 As a final example, economic studies of the obesity
epidemic point out that consumers have increasingly engaged in
massive caloric overconsumption in the past four decades, due at least
in part to the fact that health insurance and governmental programs
allow individuals to externalize most or all of the costs of becoming
obese-in a sense, the condition becomes "free."207
Along these same lines, some scholarS208 and anecdotal
evidence 209 suggest that zero prices may induce "hoarding" behavior-
where a consumer's "current inventory of an item exceeds his
inventory in previous periods while his expected consumption rate
(taste) remains constant."210 Somewhat remarkably-and of vital
importance for present purposes-this behavior occurs even absent
conditions of scarcity. 211 While these findings may on their face appear
3 EcoN J. WATCH 292 (2006) (summarizing the historical and current debate over correcting the
congestion market failure).
204. "Slots" are industry shorthand for an allocated time and place where an aircraft can
take off or land from an airport.
205. Philip Booth, Foreword to DAVID STARKIE ET AL., A MARKET IN AIRPORT SLOTS 12 (Keith
Boyfield ed., 2003).
206. See generally PAUL L. SCHUMAN, NATURAL RESOURCE UTILIZATION & POLLUTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 18 (2002), available at http://tinyurl.com/kxnyt6p ("Why do we pollute? We treat
the natural environment as a 'free good' . . . . We treat the natural environment as an 'unlimited
good.' ").
207. See, e.g., KATHRYN M. SHARPE, UNDERLYING CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS LEADING TO OVER
CONSUMPTION: EXTREMENESS AVERSION AND BUNDLING 2 (2011) ("Because the cost is spread
over all tax payers and insurance premium holders, obesity imposes negative externalities on
much of society."); Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Economic Causes and Consequences of Obesity, 26
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 239, 239 (2005) (explaining the economic repercussions of obesity
epidemic).
208. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 164, at 21-22 ("[O]verconsumption, scarcity, and even
hoarding [can occur] when resources are provided without charge."); cf. Ronald Stiff et al.,
Scarcity and Hoarding: Economic and Social Explanations and Marketing Implications, 2
ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 203, 203 (1975) ("Social and economic theories provide explanations
for hoarding demonstrating its occurrence under specialized conditions not always requiring
scarcity.").
209. E.g., Raymond, Comment to Picking Up Free Items in Public, Hoarding Ketchup:
Thievery or Frugality?, DIGERATI LIFE (Aug. 26, 2007, 2:20 PM), http://www.thedigeratilife.com/
blog/pick-up-free-items-hoard-ketchup/ ("I just ended up with a drawer full of [ketchup, soy
sauce, and hot sauce packets] for no reason at all.").
210. Stiff et al., supra note 208, at 203.
211. See id. ("Scarcity alone is insufficient to explain [hoarding behavior].").
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to run somewhat counter to Ariely, Gneezy, and Haruvy's research, 212
it must be remembered that the latter was not intended to prove that
consumers observe self-restraining or Pareto optimal social norms in
all circumstances, but simply that social norms (for better or worse)
tend to govern nonprice markets. In sum, the common thread tying
overconsumption and hoarding together is that, where consumers can
externalize some or all of the costs of a product-and particularly
where the product is offered at zero price-they are much more likely
to engage in such behaviors.
IV. COPYRIGHT FREECONOMICS: IMPLICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT LAW
The sweeping changes in the ways our society creates,
reproduces, distributes, and consumes content hold radical
implications for copyright-market participants and for copyright law
itself. Not surprisingly, the transition from the age of content scarcity
to the era of zero-price, infringing content sparked a torrent of debate
that has yet to quiet.213 On one end of the spectrum, copyright
minimalists-overoptimistically, in retrospect-heralded the prospect
of a post-copyright world.214 At the other end, the pro-copyright
contingent argued that the advent of online file sharing threatened to
stifle creativity and authorship. 215
Given the benefit of a decade's worth of hindsight, however, it
seems that both camps may have missed the mark in attempting to
predict the state of content and copyright in the twenty-first century.
The world has certainly not moved beyond copyright; if anything,
copyright law has become much more central to the everyday lives of
average citizens. Recent skirmishes in the "Intellectual Property
Wars" 2 16 have captured the public's ire and attention, and copyright
issues are now frequently splashed across the front page of national
212. See Shampan'er et al., supra note 186, at 743.
213. Compare JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 127-28
(2011) (proposing an overhaul of copyright law in order to better reconcile the law with
prevailing social norms), with Peter S. Menell, Book Note, Infringement Conflation, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 1551, 1580-81 (2012) (arguing that policy proscriptions cannot overlook the widespread
infringement occurring in contemporary markets).
214. E.g., Ku, supra note 3, at 269 ("In this process of creative destruction, digital technology
and the Internet strike at the foundation of copyright and the industries built upon copyright by
eliminating the need for firms to distribute copyrighted works and for exclusive property rights
to support creation.").
215. E.g., Liebowitz, supra note 2, at 3-4 (testing the hypothesis that file sharing harms
copyright owners).
216. See supra note 46 (regarding the bitter format wars of the 1980s).
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newspapers. 217 On the other hand, we have seen no perceptible
reduction in creative output.2 18 In fact, technological innovations have
paved the way for large-scale entry by authors and artists into
creative markets,219 greatly benefiting both consumers and creators. 220
And at least some evidence shows the same to be true for
intermediate-level content distributors. 221
Many scholars and commentators did correctly predict at least
one development: the failure of the content industry to correct,
through mass prosecution and public-service advertising campaigns,
the growing gap between copyright law and social norms associated
217. E.g., Jenna Wortham, A Political Coming of Age for the Tech Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
18, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/techies-plan-to-take-sopa-protest-to-the-
streets/?ref-jennawortham (describing virtual and physical protests in response to antipiracy
bills).
218. Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical
Analysis of Copyright's Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1720 (2009) (finding that the only
variable that consistently correlates with increasing copyright registrations-a commonly used
proxy for creative output-is increasing population size); see also Laura Hazard Owen, Ebook
Sales Way Up in 2011; Overall Trade Book Sales Roughly Flat (July 18, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://paidcontent.org/2012/07/18/ebooks-are-now-the-most-popular-format-for-adult-fiction/
("While revenues were down slightly, unit sales [of print and ebooks] were up 3.4 percent, to 2.77
billion books sold in 2011."); Publishing Market Shows Steady Title Growth in 2011 Fueled
Largely by Self-Publishing Sector, BOWKER (June 5, 2012), http://www.bowker.comlen-
US/aboutus/press-room/2012/pr_06052012.shtml (stating that "traditional print book output
grew six percent in 2011"); Andi Sporkin, Bookstats 2013 Now Available, Ass'N OF AM.
PUBLISHERS (May 15, 2013), http://www.publishers.org/press/103/ (stating that ebook sales rose
over forty-five percent in 2012).
219. See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix
Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1869-70 (2009) ("Fan fiction and remix culture have been and
are continuing to explode both in terms of social relevance and sheer quantity of new works
produced and available."); Larry E. Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics
of Amateur Journalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185, 192-93 (2006) ("Blogs ... allow individuals
to test their skills and marketability rather than have to get a job from one of a limited number
of media firms."); Top 100 Defining Cultural Moments of the Noughties, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 30
2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/6466684/Top-100-defining-cultural-moments-of-the-
OOs-noughties.html (observing that "everyone's an artist now"). See generally Lawrence Lessig,
Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 961, 975 ("Digital technology could radically
expand the range of 'creators' who participate in the remix of culture.").
220. The value of self-expression has become ensconced in the literature on both copyright
law and the First Amendment. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less:
Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1064 (2003) ("Society values
free expression and openness . . . ."); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine
Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 555 (2004) (arguing that the
fair use doctrine alone is not enough to prevent copyright law from threatening freedom of
expression).
221. Christian Handke, Plain Destruction or Creative Destruction? Copyright Erosion and the
Evolution of the Record Industry, 3 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 29, 46 (2006)
(concluding that the recent erosion of record sales in Germany prompted a substantial increase
in market entries by small firms).
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with infringing content.222 A decade after it began, this enforcement-
and-persuasion strategy223 has been largely acknowledged as a
failure.224 But legitimate-content providers have not simply
abandoned efforts to remain competitive. Instead, they have shifted
toward-and converged upon-what might be called an "adaptation"
strategy,225 devising and implementing revolutionary business models
that harness the disruptive power of creative advances in content
technologies. 226
The shift to widely accessible zero-price content has ushered in
the age of "copyright freeconomics." The blurring of the old
distinctions between ownership and access; the shift from traditional
monetary, market-based decisionmaking and incentives toward social
markets governed by an entirely different set of rules and incentives;
the "irrational" ways individuals react to zero prices-all of these
aspects of copyright freecononics will challenge the old methodology
under which copyright law is studied and applied. It is not the goal of
this Article to identify and address every possible impact the shift to
copyright freeconomics will have; instead, the following Subparts set
forth arguably the most immediately salient and necessary changes
and conclude with a call for further theoretical and empirical
scholarship.
A. The Demand Side: On Consumer Substitution and Damages
The rise of access- or usage-based business models that grant
pseudo-ownership over content has obfuscated copyright law's deep-
222. See, e.g., Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in a Digital Age: The Ongoing Conflict
Between Copyright Law and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 CAMPBELL L. Rev. 195, 206 (2006)
(arguing that the "limited effectiveness of the RIAA's . . . strategy" makes it "necessary to
identify other means of deterring music piracy online"); Andrew C. Humes, Note, The Day the
Music Died: The RIAA Sues Its Consumers, 38 IND. L. REV. 239, 265 (2005) (noting that even in
the face of RIAA lawsuits, "there are millions of consumers today who download copyrighted
music from Internet related services without paying anything for it"). But see Lemley & Reese,
supra note 107, at 1432 (arguing that "enforcement against direct infringers [is] worth a try").
On the persistent gap between copyright law and norms, see Tehranian, supra note 4.
223. Mark Schultz proposes four potential methods for dealing with a law/norm divergence:
"Surrender: Changing the Law or Abandoning Enforcement," "Deterrence: Ramping Up
Enforcement and Penalties," "Adaptation: Finding Other Ways to Combat the Problem," and
"Persuasion: Changing Norms." Mark F. Schultz, Reconciling Social Norms and Copyright Law:
Strategies for Persuading People to Pay for Recorded Music, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 59, 59 (2009).
224. James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright
Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 84 (2012) ("[T]he lawsuits
against individuals were largely seen as a failure.").
225. See Schultz, supra note 223, at 73-78 ("Adaptive strategies certainly have their place in
responding to undesirable social norms.").
226. See supra Part IH1.B.1.
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rooted distinction between ownership and usage. This change calls
into question what the closest legitimate substitute is for infringing
content. And that question, in turn, drives damages calculations in
copyright-infringement lawsuits.
Copyright enforcement efforts operate under a damages regime
that has remained largely unchanged for over three decades. Under
the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright holders who allege that their
exclusive rights have been infringed and elect to seek monetary
damages may pursue one of two paths: (1) "actual damages and any
additional profits of the infringer" or (2) statutory damages. 2 7
Congress further divided the Act's statutory damages into a tripartite
structure228 with three possible monetary ranges for statutory
damages awards, the floors or ceilings of which are to be lowered or
raised depending upon the defendant's level of mens rea. 229 These
ranges operate on a "per work" basis. 230
The two primary types of damage calculations serve several
unique purposes. The actual-damages-plus-profits remedy has two
components; a different rationale underlies each. "Damages are
awarded to compensate the copyright owner for losses from the
infringement"231-a compensatory theory. Defendant's profits,
however, "are awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly
benefiting from a wrongful act"232-a restitutionary theory meant to
prevent unjust enrichment. As to both, the copyright owner bears the
burden of proving causation (i.e., that the defendant's infringement
caused the plaintiffs actual damages or that the defendant's profits
were caused by the infringement, respectively).
The primary purposeS233 of statutory damages are (1)
compensating plaintiffs for their actual harm suffered and preventing
227. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2012).
228. For a much more detailed summary of the current U.S. statutory damages regime, as
well as a historical examination of statutory damages under the 1909 Act, see Pamela
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 446-57 (2009).
229. Thus, if an infringer "was not aware and had no reason to believe" that she was
infringing, a judge must award between $200 and $30,000 per plaintiffs work that she infringed.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). The standard range has a slightly higher floor of $750. Id. § 504(c)(1). And
finally, the ceiling is raised to $150,000 per work for cases in which the copyright holder proves
"willful" infringement. Id. § 504(c)(2).
230. See id. § 504(c).
231. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, § 504, at 161 (1976).
232. Id.; accord 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 14:4.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting House Report).
233. As it is contingent on early registration of works with the Copyright Office, the
availability of statutory damages under the 1976 Act also serves the tertiary goal of encouraging
early registration by copyright holders. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 ("[N]o award of statutory
2013] 1451
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unjust enrichment (goals similar to those of the "actual damages and
additional lost profits" remedy) where proof of damages is difficult and
(2) punishing infringers and deterring future infringing acts-a
punitive purpose. 234 Some scholars have argued that using copyright-
damages awards as punishment is inappropriate, reasoning that "the
statutory damage framework, as intended by Congress, merely seeks
to substitute for actual damages."235 Courts, however, have almost
uniformly applied statutory damages under the 1976 Act so as to serve
both compensatory and restitutionary purposes, as well as "[tihe
purpose of punitive damages-to punish and prevent malicious
conduct."236
In assessing both types of damages awards, courts properly
take into account the copyright owner's loss caused by the
infringement and the infringer's profit or gain (including expenses
saved) due to the infringement. 237 Under the actual-damages-plus-
additional-profits remedy, the sum of these amounts provides the
measure of damages. Given the additional purposes served by
statutory damages, these amounts are considered alongside other
factorS238 but nonetheless generally play an important role in damages
calculations.
damages ... shall be made for ... any infringement of copyright commenced after first
publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration
is made within three months after the first publication of the work.").
234. See, e.g., Halnat Pub. Co. v. L.A.P.A., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 933, 937 (D. Minn. 1987)
(recognizing that courts frequently award amounts that are "significantly" higher than the
statutory minimum "in order to deter defendants from violating copyright laws"); H.R. REP. No.
94-1476, at 163 (referring to the "intended deterrent effect" of the statutory damages provision);
STAFF OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 86TH CONG., STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS 8-9 (Comm. Print 1960) ("Statutory damages serve a
duofold purpose: they prohibit the award of merely nominal damages because of the difficulty in
proving actual damages and profits . . . . Secondly, they furnish the deterrence so necessary for
prospective infringers."), available at http://www.copyright.govfhistory/studies/study22.pdf.
235. Depoorter et al., supra note 86 at 1266.
236. On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001). But see Kamakazi Music Corp.
v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (denying the plaintiffs claim for
punitive damages, as "[t]he public policy rationale for punitive damages of punishing and
preventing malicious conduct can be properly accounted for in the provisions for increasing a
maximum statutory damage award").
237. Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, Measure of Damages and Profits to Which Copyright
Owner Is Entitled Under 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(b), 100 A.L.R. FED. 258, § 3 (1990).
238. "Among the factors for the court to consider in awarding damages are (1) expenses
saved and profits reaped by the defendant, (2) revenues lost by the plaintiffs, (3) the deterrent
value of the award, and (4) whether the infringement was willful or innocent." Sixx Gunner
Music v. Quest, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 272, 274 (D. Mass. 2011) (quoting Polygram Int'l Publ'g,
Inc. v. Nev./TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1335 (D. Mass. 1994)); see also Gnat Booty Music v.
Creative Catering of Wadhams, LLC, 761 F. Supp. 2d 604, 609 (E.D. Mich. 2011):
Courts have wide discretion in determining the appropriate amount, but are urged to
consider three main factors: "the expenses saved and profits reaped by the defendants
1452
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Calculating the copyright owner's loss or the infringer's gain
(in the form of expenses saved)239 caused by the infringement
inherently requires identifying the next best noninfringing substitute
for the infringing content. 240 More specifically, in order to determine
the "revenues lost by the plaintiff," a court must determine what
product the plaintiff would have sold or licensed to the defendant in
the hypothetical world that would have existed but for the
infringement.241 "The question is not what the owner would have
charged, but rather what is the fair market value."242 A similar
analysis applies to calculating "expenses saved" or "value of use,"
subject to the proviso that double-counting is not allowed. 243
in connection with the infringements, the revenues lost by the plaintiffs as a result of
the defendants' conduct, and the infringers' state of mind whether willful, knowing, or
merely innocent."
(quoting Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908, 914 (D. Conn. 1980))).
239. Of course, the defendant's profits are susceptible of measurement without
determination of the closest substitute in the marketplace.
240. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Newman Bros., 337 F. Supp. 859, 862-63 (S.D. Ohio 1971)
(finding that, where plaintiff failed to show that defendant's infringing product was a substitute
for plaintiffs product, plaintiff had failed to show any actual damages); cf. Amsinck v. Colum.
Pictures Indus., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that "[c]ourts look to
whether the 'copying' can be used as a substitute for the plaintiffs original work" in the fair use
context).
241. See, e.g., Thornton v. J Jargon Co., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2008) ("[A]
claim for lost profits may include a retroactive license fee measured by what the plaintiff would
have earned by licensing the infringing use to the defendant."); Country Rd. Music, Inc. v.
MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[T]he inquiry is an objective one into
the 'fair market value,' the result of 'negotiation between a willing buyer and a willing seller,' for
a license for 'the use the infringer made,' not 'the highest use for which plaintiff might
license' .... (quoting On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 166 & n.5, 172 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citations omitted)); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1249 (D. Kan.
1998) ("A copyright owner's actual damages are equal to the profits it would have earned but for
the defendant's infringement."); Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1068-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (assessing the degree to which the legitimate and illegitimate goods were
substitutes for one another).
242. On Davis, 246 F.3d at 166.
243. The Seventh Circuit, in Deltak, Inc., created the "value of use" damage calculation
method to provide a remedy where lost profits are too difficult to quantify, the defendant made
no profits, and the copyright owner's failure to register her work precludes the statutory
damages route. Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Sys., Inc., 767 F.2d 357, 360-64 (7th Cir. 1985); see also
Kevin Bendix, Note, Copyright Damages: Incorporating Reasonable Royalty from Patent Law, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 527, 535 (2012) (discussing the "value of use" method established in
Deltak, Inc.).
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1. Destruction of the Ownership/Usage Dichotomy
Content end users have already begun to recognize the
destruction of copyright's old ownership/usage dichotomy.244 As the
title of a recent blog post wryly observed, "I never owned any music to
begin with."245 Increasingly, the same could be said for many end
users of other forms of content. Zero-price offerings that offer access in
place of outright ownership can now act as ready substitutes for
owned copies. 246 Yet, while end users have been quick to note the shift,
copyright scholars and courts have been (unfortunately) slower to do
SO.
a. Demand-Side Substitution
In the digital realm, thus far, courts have assumed that "a
purchased copy" is a "direct substitute" for downloading an infringing
copy. 247 The new zero-price models for content delivery, however,
grant users control rights that begin to converge on ownership. 248
These pseudo-ownership products and services, rather than
traditional owned goods, are, in many cases, likely the closest
substitutes for infringing content. The empirical literature on digital
copyright infringement, which has an unfortunately persistent
tendency to compare the online distribution and consumption of
infringing content solely to ownership-transferring sales-and even,
anachronistically, to physical media 249-- cannot yet verify or deny this
hypothesis. Yet anecdotal evidence, 250 statements by the creators of
some zero-price, legitimate-content providers that their services were
intended to compete directly with piracy,251 and even evidence that




246. Id. ("If I wanted to listen to something I didn't already have in my patchwork [music]
collection, I could stream it on Spotify.").
247. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.).
248. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
249. E.g., Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, The Effect of Internet Piracy on CD Sales:
Cross-Section Evidence, 1 REv. ECON. REs. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 71, 72 (2004) (examining the
relationship between music downloads and tangible music sales).
250. See, e.g., Shawn Powers, Why Hulu Plus Sucks, and Why You Should Use It Anyway,
LINUX J. (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/why-hulu-plus-sucks-and-why-
you-should-use-it-anyway/ (observing that the advent of a freemium television provider would
likely impact the author's torrenting behavior).




infringing providers attempt to compete with legitimate ad-supported
or freemium serviceS252 all suggest that this is likely the case.
Furthermore, it also seems likely that the type of individual who
would engage in zero-price digital infringement may be particularly
attracted to the "magic" of zero priceS25 3 and would therefore turn to
new-model content providers as the next-closest substitute. And the
trend toward combining ownership and access appears likely to
continue in the future,254 making it even more likely that zero-price,
legitimate content will assume the role of the closest substitute for
zero-price, illegitimate content.
b. Suggested Analytical Framework
Given that zero-price-access-based content offerings are likely
closer substitutes for obtaining infringing copies than obtaining actual
ownership of legitimate copies in many instances, courts attempting to
assess actual or statutory copyright damages will need to account for
the difference in revenue sources between the new models and the old.
Again, revenue from zero-price content offerings is frequently derived
from advertising, 255 and advertising revenue depends in turn upon
how much attention users (and thus potential consumers) pay to a
given advertisement. 256 Thus, depending upon the particular
substitute, the defendant's access or usage rates can assume primary
relevance. Should courts persist in using transfer of ownership as the
sole point of comparison, they run the risk of either overcompensating
plaintiffs where usage rates are extremely low (or even nonexistent) or
undercompensating plaintiffs where usage rates are high. In some
instances, data on defendants' actual usage of works will be obtainable
by subpoena. 257 But since the defendant will almost always be best
situated to produce evidence of actual usage, decision theory suggests
that the proper analytical framework would place the initial burden
on the plaintiff to make a threshold showing of some workable
measure of damages (e.g., average consumer usage), then shift the
252. Janko Roettgers, How LimeWire's Grapevine Tried to Compete with Spotify, GIGAOM
(Oct. 27, 2011, 12:03 PM), http://gigaom.com/2011/10/27/limewire-grapevine-subscription-service/
(describing how LimeWire attempted to develop a paid-subscription service).
253. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
254. See Roettgers, supra note 252 ("[Content providers] may need to think about combining
access with ownership.").
255. As noted supra, freemium models tend to include at least some advertisements even in
the paid versions of their services.
256. See supra Part III.B. Lb.




burden to the defendant to try to rebut those figures by evidence of her
actual usage.
2. The Non-usage Defense
Consumers facing zero-price options-particularly where they
can externalize the costs entailed by those options-often engage in
overconsumption or hoarding-type behavior.258 In content markets,
externalizing can occur where an individual consumes an infringing
work she obtained for $0.00, for the costs of creating the work must
then be borne by a smaller group of legitimate consumers and
(potentially) the author of the work. Once again, the empirical
research on this subject in the realm of copyrighted content is
generally lacking, though this lacuna is perhaps unsurprising given
the nascent nature of both zero-price legitimate-content markets and
the behavioral economics and psychology literature on zero-price
goods. As to rivalrous goods, at least one study has found revealed
preferences that demonstrate a prevailing social norm that limits
consumption.25 9 The nonrivalrous nature of digitized, copyrighted
works, however, likely cuts against the possibility of this norm
applying to zero-price content-market transactions. If consumer
behavior in these markets instead mimics that in others where goods
are seen as "free" and "limitless,"260 content consumers may frequently
engage in overconsumption (i.e., acquiring content that they
subsequently do not ever, or very rarely, access) and hoarding (storing
same).
These phenomena, if satisfactorily demonstrated, should give
rise to a non-usage defense. Put simply, if the next best substitute for
infringement is a zero-price, usage-based service, and an end user
behaving irrationally were to obtain an infringing copy but never use
it (or perhaps use it only very rarely, such that the cost of equivalent
legitimate use were de minimis), there would be no quantifiable harm
to the copyright owner that could translate into a damages award.261
Because the defendant never used or accessed the work, the
hypothetical but-for-the-infringement scenario still would have yielded
258. See supra Part UI.D.3.
259. See Kristina Shampan'er & Dan Ariely, How Small Is Zero Price? The True Value of
Free Products 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 06-16, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=951742.
260. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (using pollution as an example of
overconsumption of a seemingly "free" good).
261. This defense would not apply to defendants who "used" the work by allowing others to
make copies of it.
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no revenues to the copyright owner as revenue under the new model is
derived solely from usage or access. Similarly, the defendant's
infringement would not have allowed any avoided costs (not even
attention costs), and the value-of-use methodology would be entirely
inapplicable. Thus, at least as to the actual-damages-plus-additional-
profits remedy, the proper damages award would be zero, or only
nominal, damages. 262
Of course, the additional punitive theory underlying statutory
damages could militate toward awarding some positive amount of
damages (in order to punish the defendant and deter both the
defendant and others from future infringing activities).2 63 Here,
though, courts must be especially and increasingly careful to avoid
running afoul of the constitutional safeguards preventing excessive
punitive damages awards. In the two individual file-sharing cases that
have actually proceeded to trial, both district courts held that the
large damages awards violated the defendants' substantive due
process rights.264 While this new front in the constitutional copyright
debate remains an unsettled area of law, the minimal- or zero-harm
scenarios that could result as described above would strain even
further the guideposts laid down by the Court in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore265 and subsequently applied in several recent
cases.266 Since one indicator of unconstitutionality under this line of
cases is the ratio of actual harm to damages, 267 any substantial
262. Nominal damages would, at the very least, preserve the expressive value of the law. See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024
(1996) (discussing "the function of law in 'making statements' as opposed to controlling behavior
directly").
263. Historically, punitive damages also served other purposes. Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive
Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 91 (2007). Today, however, "[clommentators
and courts generally are in agreement that the twin purposes of punitive damages are
punishment and deterrence." Id. at 90.
264. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1061 (D. Minn. 2010);
Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 121 (D. Mass. 2010).
265. 517 U.S. 559, 575-82 (1996) (setting forth the three-pronged analysis that has become
the touchstone of modern due process scrutiny of punitive damages awards).
266. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 352-53 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418-20 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 429 (2001). For a general discussion of this line of cases, see F. Patrick Hubbard,
Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: 'Morals Without Technique'?, 60
FLA. L. REV. 349, 349 (2008) (arguing that the Court's current approach should be abandoned);
and Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 228, at 480-91.
267. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 580 ("[The] commonly cited indicium of an
unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the
plaintiff."). The Court ultimately held that the award being reviewed was unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause, reasoning in part that an actual-harm-to-punitive-damages ratio of
500:1 was "breathtaking." Id. at 583.
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punitive award in these scenarios could run the risk of being found
unconstitutional. 268
Failing to account for these phenomena would likely stretch
further the yawning gap between copyright law and the social norms
surrounding content.269 Statutory damages awards for digital
copyright infringement have, as noted above, shocked the sensibilities
of judges and market participants alike, strongly suggesting that this
area is one in which copyright's law/norm divide is particularly
strained. 270 And infringement awards that far exceed the measure of
actual harm to copyright holders could also have the perverse effect of
contributing to a "backlash," wherein perceived overenforcement of
copyright law might actually trigger an increase in copyright
infringement. 27 1 The "expressive" value of law plays a crucial role
here-where applications of copyright statutes express values that are
perceived as draconian or unjust, copyright law will lose legitimacy in
the eyes of the public. 272
B. The Supply Side: Moral Rights and Utilitarian Incentives
Copyright freeconomics also portends a radical upheaval in the
structure of copyright law itself. Until now, a centuries-old dichotomy
has divided copyright into two halves: one comprising utilitarian
rights and the other moral rights. In the copyright-content industries
discussed herein, however, this dichotomy may well collapse-if it has
not done so already.
The bundle of utilitarian rights generally includes the rights of
reproduction, distribution, public display and performance, and
(sometimes) 273 the right to prepare derivative works. 274 The creation of
these rights was justified not on natural rights grounds; rather, they
268. It should be noted that the ratio-based analysis does "specifically allow[] for departing
from single-digit ratios where economic harm is small. . . ." Klass, supra note 263, at 104.
269. See generally Tehranian, supra note 4, at 543 (discussing copyright law's 'law/norm
gap").
270. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (describing judicial and popular
responses to digital copyright infringement damage awards).
271. Cf. Depoorter et al., supra note 86, at 1263-67 (discussing the "copyright backlash"
effect).
272. For a discussion of the expressive theory, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000) ("At the
most general level, expressive theories tell actors-whether individuals, associations, or the
State-to act in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward various substantive values.").
273. Professor Kwall notes that the derivative-works right can serve moral ends, albeit in a
limited manner. KWALL, supra note 18, at 26-27.
274. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (codifying the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright
Act of 1976).
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are generally understood to exist as positive law and are justified on a
utilitarian basis. More specifically, they are meant to supply ex ante
incentives for the socially desirable creation of artistic works.275 These
utilitarian rights do so in theory by correcting the perceived market
failure that arises because noncreators face only the variable costs of
reproducing and distributing intellectual property and need not
recoup the fixed costs of creation.276 Absent copyright law, a creator-
who must recoup her creation costs by charging above-marginal-cost
prices-would be unable to compete effectively with a noncreator. As a
result, there would generally be no ex ante incentive to author
creative works. 277 The rights that fall under this umbrella are often
called the "economic rights" 278 and are understood to be conceptually
separate, and sometimes diametrically opposed to, moral rights. 279
Moral rights, on the other hand, are widely understood to be
more akin to natural rights. Rather than creating an ex ante incentive
to create, reproduce, and distribute artistic works, moral rights are
instead meant primarily to protect the "personhood" or "personality" of
275. See, e.g., Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright's Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
331, 360 (2012) ("Incentives operate ex ante: copyright aims to get people to produce works they
otherwise would not.").
276. See supra Part II.A.
277. The utilitarian/incentivizing theory is ensconced in the IP Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which grants Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
278. E.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept.
9, 1886, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1988) ("Independently of the author's economic rights ... the
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work . . . ."); Justin Hughes, American
Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar "Gap," 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 662-63 (describing
economic" and "moral" rights and their roles in U.S. copyright law); Aaron D. White, The
Copyright Tree: Using German Moral Rights as the Roots for Enhanced Authorship Protection in
the United States, 9 LoY. L. & TECH. ANN. 30, 31 (2010) (distinguishing between "economic" and
"noneconomic" rights); Zemer, supra note 18, at 1520 (stating that copyright holders have rights
of "both economic and moral stature"); Albert Fang, Note, Let Digital Technology Lay the Moral
Right of Integrity to Rest, 26 CONN. J. INT'L L. 457, 458 (2011).
279. E.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 137 (rev. ed. 2003) ("Commentators regularly cite the doctrine of an author's moral
right, and its rejection in the United States, as evidence of a profound and pervasive division
separating two cultures of copyright .... ); Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and
Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 1134 (2010) (distinguishing between harm to the
"economic incentive to create and disseminate copyrighted works" and harm to "[a]uthors'
natural and moral rights"); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral
Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 102 (1997) ("mhe
interests protected by moral rights doctrine . .. are 'personality' interests that are fundamentally
different from the 'economic' or 'commercial' interests that are protected by the
copyright ... doctrine[]."); Hughes, supra note 278, at 663 ("These moral rights are often
portrayed as quite alien and distinct from the economic or patrimonial rights associated with
copyrighted works. . . .").
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authors.28 0 The two most commonly guaranteed moral rights are the
right of "attribution," which "guarantees that the author's selected
form of identification with the work remains" and generally "include[s]
a right against misattribution," and the right of "integrity," which
"allows the artist to object to distortions, alterations, or changes in the
work."281 Because these rights are seen as entirely distinct from the
utilitarian/incentivizing rights, they are often referred to as
"noneconomic" rights. 282
Generally speaking, "[T]he American culture of copyright
centers on a hard, utilitarian calculus that balances the needs of
copyright producers against the needs of copyright consumers . . . ."283
While moral rights feature more prominently in the continental
tradition,284 the moral-rights movement has successfully established
only one small beachhead in U.S. copyright law: the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA"). 285 That Act (as its name suggests) was
limited to protecting small-run, limited-edition "works of visual art."286
And it protects only a small subset of works traditionally considered to
be "visual art"-VARA does not extend to any "poster, map, globe,
chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture
or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical,
280. See, e.g., Yonatan Even, The Right of Integrity in Software: An Economic Analysis, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 219, 240 (2006) ('The underlying assumption
[behind moral rights] is that creative works reflect their authors' personalities, and that these
are therefore entitled to protection above and beyond that of copyrights; protection against any
injury to the author's 'personality' interest."); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 350-55 (1988) ("For copyright owners, there also exists an inalienable
right to guard the integrity of a work against change that would damage the author's reputation
or destroy his intended message."); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REV. 957, 1013 n.202 (1982) (suggesting that the idea of a property right in personhood
is relevant to copyright "droit moral," or moral rights).
281. Hughes, supra note 278, at 660.
282. See, e.g., Dale P. Olson, Common Law Misappropriation in the Digital Era, 64 Mo. L.
REV. 837, 845-46 (1999) (describing "the protection of moral, or noneconomic rights," that are
"independent of the rights inherent in copyright."); William Patry, The Role, or Not, of Ethics and
Morality in Copyright Law, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 445, 446 (2011) ("Droit moral are noneconomic
rights reflecting both the creator's bond with the work and the creator's reputation. . . ."); cf. Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Maharam of Padua v. Giustiniani: The Sixteenth-Century Origins of the
Jewish Law of Copyright, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 821, 843 (2007) (observing that the "noneconomic,"
moral rights account of copyright originates in Kantian philosophy).
283. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 279, at 138.
284. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 11 (3d ed.
2010).
285. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). One other copyright statute is related, though fairly
tangentially, to ensuring attribution-a provision in the 1998 Digital Millenium Copyright Act
("DMCA") bans altering or removing "copyright management information" that is transferred




data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or
similar publication."287 Given the entrenched conceptual divide
between the utilitarian/incentivizing "economic" rights and the
"noneconomic" moral rights, the persistently narrow field of moral
rights in U.S. copyright law is unsurprising. 288 Put Simply, if
copyrights cannot be justified on utilitarian/incentivizing grounds,
they are likely to face intense opposition from U.S. copyright
stakeholders. And it is not the aim of this Article to counter that
position, which finds strong constitutional purchase in the language of
the Intellectual Property Clause.289 Instead, I contend that at least
some of the so-called moral rights may-for the first time-be justified
on utilitarian/incentivizing grounds.
1. The Destruction of the Utilitarian/Moral Rights Dichotomy
The paradigm shift in the economics of content industries calls
into serious question the standard dichotomy separating
utilitarian/incentivizing rights from moral rights. True, authors and
artists who license their work to for-profit-content, ad-supported-
content, or freemium-content providers frequently do so in exchange
for financial remuneration, as did authors and artists in the past.290
As to such content creators and providers, the traditional, pecuniary-
focused copyrights of exclusive reproduction, distribution, derivative-
works preparation, and public performance and display remain
relevant to incentivizing the creation and dissemination of works. A
growing number of artistic creators, however, have begun to offer their
works to consumers at a price of $0.00 without receiving any direct
financial compensation of the sort contemplated by the traditional
utilitarian/incentivizing copyrights.291
As the pioneering research of Heyman and Ariely suggests, this
result should not be surprising, given that people may actually
increase the amount of effort they are willing to expend when
monetary rewards are lowered so that the transaction shifts from a
287. § 101.
288. As an example of the strength of opposition to adoption or expansion of moral rights, the
United States "refused accession to the [Berne] Convention for over 60 years following the
adoption of Article 6bis. To a large extent, this was specifically because Article 6bis dictates the
introduction of moral rights into member-states' jurisdictions. . . ." Even, supra note 280, at 241.
289. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
290. See, e.g., Pandora, Spotify Face Off in Free Online Music Market, ABS-CBNNEWS.COM
(May 7, 2012), http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/business/05/07/12/pandora-spotify-face-free-online-
music-market ("[T]he firm operates under a license that requires paying royalties to the artists
played by its listeners.").
291. See supra Part III.D.1.
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"market" contract (low but positive reward) to a social contract (zero
monetary reward).292 To the extent that creators can now reach
consumers directly or through intermediaries that do not derive
revenues from advertising or paid subscriptions, such content can also
be enjoyed free of even the attention costs associated with
advertisements (whether for third-party goods or services or the
proprietor's paid-subscription product). In other words, these
transactions verge on being truly free.293
As a result, the emerging body of literature discussed in Part
III indicates that these transactions occur in a sphere that falls very
close to the purely social, rather than financial, end of the spectrum.294
Other transactions, for example those between artists being paid zero
and for-profit, ad-supported content firms, may fall somewhere in the
middle of this spectrum, displaying at least some aspects of social
markets. In social content markets, behavior, norms, and-most
importantly for present purposes-incentives to create and
disseminate all become social in nature. The contracts governing
transactions are social contracts that, like the bowl of zero-price candy
in Ariely, Gneezy, and Haruvy's experiment, 295 do not involve money
and therefore evoke social cues. And in this environment, social
incentives to create assume primary importance, while the traditional
pecuniary incentives fade into irrelevance.
In the social sphere, status seeking is a powerful incentive for
action.296 Receiving attribution, or credit, for one's innovation,
creation, or contribution is an increasingly vital method of increasing
or maintaining the creator's or contributor's social status.297 If, for
example, an author seeks to become the foremost expert in a field, she
may now decide to make her commentary available at zero cost
through a variety of media in order to "get her name out there." She
may be happy, even eager, to let others reproduce and distribute her
292. See Heyman & Ariely, supra note 194, at 787.
293. From the perspective of consumers, opportunity costs (as always) remain.
294. See supra Part III.D.1-2.
295. See Shampan'er et al., supra note 186.
296. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 723 (2011) ("[P]eople seek social status
within valued social groups and social inclusion. . . .").
297. See Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95
GEO. L.J. 49, 50 (2006):
Attribution is foundational to the modern economy. The reputation we develop for the
work we do proves to the world the nature of our human capital. Credit is
instrumentally beneficial in establishing a reputation and intrinsically valuable




work for free-but only so long as she receives attribution.298 Likewise,
ensuring that creative output is not mangled or altered in ways that
would be harmful to the creator's reputation is also a necessary
element of increasing or maintaining the creator's social status. 299 The
right of integrity serves this goal.300
Before the advent of copyright freeconomics, however, neither
right was central to incentivizing content creation and dissemination
in the same way that traditional, pecuniary-focused copyrights were.
Even if some authors were motivated to create by purely social aims,
many were not,301 and in any event the costs associated with
reproduction and distribution invariably necessitated the traditional
pecuniary incentives in order to induce intermediary providers to
enter the market. Creation in a vacuum has never been the prize
sought by copyright law; thus, the pecuniary copyrights remained
necessary to incentivize the dissemination (if not always the creation)
of artistic works. 302 To the extent that authors and artists did want to
create and distribute works in zero-price, social markets, there were
relatively few such markets available.
But as social avenues and markets for content creation and
dissemination become increasingly prevalent, granting or expanding
the rights of attribution and integrity-noneconomic moral rights-
may become justifiable on utilitarian/incentivizing grounds. In social
markets, guaranteeing the right of attribution or integrity could very
well serve as a much greater incentive to engage in the creation and
dissemination of socially desirable artistic or literary works than the
traditional utilitarian copyrights. This is so because, by ensuring that
a potential creator's output would increase her social status, the rights
of attribution and integrity would act not only as a protection of the
creator's personhood, but also as an ex ante incentive to create. Yet,
the traditional utilitarian/incentivizing rights-given their
298. For a similar example, see Lastowka, supra note 6, at 60 (discussing law professors who
"give away" copies of scholarly articles).
299. Certainly, not everyone would agree with this statement; some call for the elimination
even of the present, narrow right of integrity. See, e.g., Fang, supra note 278, at 458 (arguing
that "the moral right of integrity is obsolete in the face of the digital world").
300. In U.S. law, it does so (within the limited context of VARA) by preventing "distortion,
mutilation, or other modification" of a work where such alteration "would be prejudicial to [the
creator's] honor or reputation." 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (2012).
301. See, e.g., Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 55-57 (1995) (statements of Bob Dylan, Don Henley, and Carlos
Santana, among others, to the effect that the Act's grant of exclusive rights incentivizes their
artistic creations).
302. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas." (emphasis added)).
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overarching aim of allowing above-marginal-cost pricing-would play
a significantly smaller incentivizing role in social content markets,
where neither creators nor distributors (here, frequently the same
entity) receive direct financial recompense or charge any price, let
alone an above-cost price.303 Thus, the traditional utilitarian/moral
rights dichotomy underlying copyright law and much of the scholarly
debate surrounding it may collapse in the face of copyright
freeconomics. At the very least, it seems likely to emerge-if at all-in
a significantly weakened state.
2. Potential Utilitarian Foundation for Moral Rights
Analyzing potential expansions of copyright law based on
utilitarian/incentivizing goals can, and generally will, yield a different
policy prescription than would analyses based solely on natural-law,
moral-rights grounds. There is, as of yet, essentially no empirical
research on the behavior of creators and potential creators in the new-
model social markets; thus, a definitive call for the expansion of the
rights to attribution and integrity in U.S. copyright law would be
premature. And given the questionable success of previous expansions
of U.S. copyright protections that have been based on the traditional
utilitarian/incentivizing rationale,304 any future expansions ought to
be based upon real, persuasive evidence that increasing protection will
likely lead to a net increase in creative output.305 Should future
research bear out present intuitions, however, the rights granted in
VARA may warrant expansion beyond their current narrow scope to
include significantly more (and perhaps all) of the content susceptible
to creation and dissemination in social markets. A priori, there would
seem to be no principled distinction for utilitarian/incentivizing
purposes between limited edition works and other works, or between
303. Though this Article does not go so far, it could be argued that this indicates that there is
therefore no need whatsoever for such rights in these markets.
304. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 3, at 269.
305. Any expansion of copyright-given its history-is likely to be greeted with no small
amount of skepticism. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 34, at 250-51 (suggesting a fixed copyright
term of five years, because "[a] change in the copyright term would have no effect on the
incentives for authors to produce work today"); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 11
(2001) ("[S]ince 1909, courts and corporations have exploited public concern for rewarding
established authors by steadily limiting the rights of readers, consumers, and emerging
artists."); Abraham Drassinower, A Note on Incentives, Rights, and the Public Domain in
Copyright Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1869, 1870 (2011) ("[WJhereas copyright minimalists
object strenuously to this expansion [of copyright scope and subject matter], copyright
maximalists support it."); Rebecca Tushnet, supra note 18, at 792 ("[Clopyright's control rights
have metastasized, harming creativity and access to creative works.").
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narrowly defined visual arts and audio, text-based, or audiovisual
content. 306 At the very least, VARA's blanket exclusion of "electronic
publication[s]" 3 07 from protection appears suspect after having
reconceptualized moral rights as capable of granting significant
additional or unique incentives to create and distribute. In either case,
an expansion of the right to attribution and integrity that was
justified on utilitarian/incentivizing grounds, instead of the old moral-
rights theory, would fit much more comfortably within the utilitarian
tradition of U.S. copyright law,308 thus making it substantially more
likely to actually occur.309 Of course, any such change should also be
dependent on the development of a legal definitional and enforcement
scheme capable of satisfactorily realizing those goals-likely no small
task.310
3. An Alternative-Instead of Additional-Remedy Structure
Finally, the dynamic described above 311 suggests one possibility
that could manage the neat trick of expanding the rights of integrity
and attribution while appeasing both copyright minimalists and
maximalists. 312 Because some creators and distributors are now
realistically motivated solely by nonpecuniary incentives while others
are motivated by pecuniary ones, yet both groups often create the
same types of works,313 segregating rights based on type of work (as
the current legal structure does) is likely an inefficient means of
incentivizing authorship and dissemination. Instead, copyright law
could be altered such that copyright owners may choose to enforce one
of two bundles of utilitarian-based rights: either the pecuniary-focused
306. But cf. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 874
(2007) ("Sound reasons may support confining the application of moral rights to a smaller
category of works than are covered by copyright law."). Professor Kwall, of course, wrote under
copyright's paradigmatic operating assumption-contested in this Article-that moral rights of
attribution and integrity can be justified only on the "infusion of the creator's mind, heart, and
soul into her work." Id. at 873.
307. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
308. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 279, at 138 (contrasting the European, author-centric view
of copyright with the U.S. view that attempts to balance the interests of authors and the general
public).
309. For an argument that attribution "ought to become more central to copyright law," see
Lastowka, supra note 6, at 85. Professor Lastowka concludes that the presence or lack of
attribution ought to be considered as a fifth factor in fair use analysis.
310. See Tushnet, supra note 18, at 795 (arguing that an attribution law would necessarily
be vague, generating further uncertainty in the already uncertain world of copyright law).
311. See supra Part III.D.1.
312. Cf. Drassinower, supra note 305, at 1871 (arguing that a rights-based account of
copyright may be less distasteful to copyright minimalists than it would initially appear to be).
313. See Nandi & Rochelandet, supra note 51, at 31.
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rights (reproduction, distribution, etc.) or the social-status-based
rights (attribution and integrity).
This structure would operate somewhat similarly to the
current remedies structure, under which copyright owners can choose
to pursue either actual damages (and lost profits) or statutory
damages. 314 Importantly, it would allow creators and distributors-
who are in the best position to do so-to self-segregrate based on
primary incentive type. Under such a regime, copyright plaintiffs who
view harm from infringement through a market-transactional lens
could opt to enforce traditional, pecuniary-focused copyrights. And
plaintiffs focused primarily on social-type harm could choose to
vindicate the bundle of rights currently deemed noneconomic.
This enforcement structure may well be a much more efficient
means of stimulating creative output than the current structure of
U.S. copyright law. As such, it would better serve copyright's
constitutionally mandated purpose of promoting "Progress." And by
adding the rights of integrity and attribution without necessarily
expanding the scope of copyright protection, this proposal would likely
be viewed more favorably by copyright stakeholders than past
copyright expansions have been.
C. Call for Further Research
The rise of copyright freeconomics will, in all likelihood, raise
myriad issues and problems beyond those discussed in this Article.
Further research, both theoretical and empirical, will be needed to
address these issues as they arise. On a more positive note, however,
further study of the subject will also likely illuminate additional areas
in which copyright law may be tweaked and improved to better
balance the competing interests of copyright stakeholders. This
Subpart identifies a few aspects of the subject that are likely
candidates for further research.
First, a much more developed understanding of how consumers
react to zero-price, digital content is needed. For example, Dr.
Shampan'er and Professor Ariely have suggested that "[p]eople tend to
ignore opportunity cost and other costs, including attention and search
costs, of getting content for free online."315 Yet their hypothesis
remains untested. As noted above, copyright stakeholders will require
a working knowledge of substitution rates between new-model content
314. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
315. Ariely & Shampan'er, supra note 259.
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offerings and more traditional ones.316 And confirmation that content
end users engage in overconsumption or hoarding behavior, as well as
measurement of the rates at which they do so and the conditions that
trigger such behavior, will be important to the development and
refinement of the non-usage defense discussed above.317 Perhaps, for
example, the source of a creative work plays a crucial role in triggering
certain norms and behaviors. Consumers might be more likely to
engage in overconsumption of works by remote, objectively successful
artists than of works created by local, struggling artists; if that is the
case, courts ought to consider the source of the infringed works in
evaluating claims of non-usage.
Second, there is currently a knowledge gap regarding how
authors, artists, and distributors react to freeconomic incentives, cues,
and social norms. 318 The scant literature that currently exists tends to
focus on the motivations of illegitimate distributors.319 Accordingly, to
ensure that copyright law fulfills its constitutionally mandated
purpose-to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts" 3 2 0 -
the current study and understanding of incentives to create will need
to undergo a true paradigm shift. And particularly, given the
questionable success of previous changes to U.S. copyright law in
achieving that purpose, 321 prudence demands that solid evidence be
gathered before embarking on any substantial course changes.
Fortunately, a careful study of incentives to create and distribute
content under these new business models and conditions holds the
potential to enable judges and legislators to modify copyright law to
better serve its utilitarian/incentivizing role in the future.
Finally, given the shift toward social content markets, research
into the norms governing social contracts and transactions in such
markets is needed. Only relatively recently did the field of law and
316. See supra Part IV.A.1.a.
317. See supra Part IV.A.2.
318. Additionally, economists are still struggling to understand the functioning of any
multisided market, let alone ones that offer their products at zero prices. David S. Evans, The
Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 330 (2003)
("Despite their economic importance, multi-sided markets have only recently received attention
from economists. . . .").
319. E.g., Nandi & Rochelandet, supra note 51, at 31 (finding that "copyright
enforcement ... has no impact on contribution behavior," but that such behavior can be
"motivated by social influence").
320. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
321. See, e.g., Ku et al., supra note 218; Arlen W. Langvardt, The Beat Should Not Go On:
Resisting Early Calls for Further Extensions of Copyright Duration, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 783,
810-11 (2008) (stating that the Copyright Term Extension Act "was an ill-considered idea" and
arguing against any future copyright term extensions).
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economics discover the importance of social norms.322 To date,
empirical studies have focused on the nature of the social norms that
govern infringement. 3 23 However, the field of study must move beyond
simply concluding that the prevalent perception, when it comes to
digital copyright infringement, is that "everyone is doing it."324
Instead, the focus ought to shift toward understanding the
multifaceted nature of these nascent markets and must be expanded
to include a study of the developing social norms that govern each
body of copyright stakeholders. This body of research will hold
widespread implications for the design and application of copyright
law, including-though certainly not limited to-the punitive aspect of
statutory damages. 325
V. CONCLUSION
During the last decade, copyright law has drawn increasingly
intense criticism from scholars and stakeholders. Much of this
criticism stems from the cavernous gap between the state of the law
and the actual behavior and social norms that are observable in real-
world content markets. As the platforms through which we create,
distribute, and consume copyrighted content have taken massive leaps
forward, copyright law itself has remained largely static. Thus, the
law/norm divide in copyright law has continued to widen.
This Article is the first to analyze the rise of copyright
freeconomics. It ought not be the last. The freeconomic revolution
322. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
537, 539 ("In their early works, Coase, Calabresi, and Posner all addressed some situations
where informal social controls might be more influential than legal rules. Norms, however, were
simply beyond their field of reckoning.").
323. E.g., Steven Lysonski & Srinivas Durvasula, Digital Piracy of MP3s: Consumer and
Ethical Predispositions, 25 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 167, 167 (2008) (finding that digital
copyright infringement, in the form of downloading illegitimate copies of copyrighted song files,
"continues at a high rate today driven by a strong belief that it is not ethically wrong").
324. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, DISCOVERING BEHAVIORS AND ATTITUDES RELATED TO
PIRATING CONTENT 1 (2010), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/enindustry/entertainment-
medialassets/piracy-survey-summary-report-0111.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted)
(displaying the results of a consumer research program that explored motivations and general
consumer attitudes regarding online copyright infringement); see also Manesh, supra note 54, 6
& n.12 ("[S]tatistical and anecdotal evidence suggests that file sharers see nothing wrong with
infringement.").
325. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 351 (1997) ("The phenomena of social influence and social meaning matter for deterrence.");
Geraldine Szott Moore, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality,
Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 778-79 (2003) (arguing that an "inquiry into
the harm and morality of copyright infringement" undercuts the supposed justifications for the
No Electronic Theft Act of 1997 and the DMCA).
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brought about by technological and business-model innovations
undoubtedly carries with it myriad implications for the structure and
theory of copyright law, only a handful of which are addressed herein.
Further research, analysis and-most importantly-real changes are
needed. Copyright law, at least as applied to content, must either
evolve to face the new reality or run the risk of extinction through
irrelevance.
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